Three Essays on Labor Markets by Yao, Yao
Three Essays on Labor Markets
Inauguraldissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
der Universität Mannheim
vorgelegt von
Yao Yao
Mannheim, 2013
Abteilungssprecher: Prof. Dr. Eckhard Janeba
Referent: Prof. Tom Krebs, Ph.D.
Korreferent: PD Dr. Friedhelm Pfeiffer
Datum der mündlichen Prüfung: 18. November 2013
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to express my very great appreciation to my supervisor,
Professor Tom Krebs, for his continuous guidance, enthusiastic encouragement and useful
critiques during the planning and development of this research work. His willingness to
give his time and patience so generously has been very much appreciated. He has been
always available for anything I would like to discuss with him, and consistently offered
me guidance and assistance. The thesis would not have been possibly done without his
supervision.
I would like to offer my special thanks to Professor Alex Ludwig for his constructive ad-
vice and assistance and sharing his comprehensive knowledge. My grateful thanks are also
extended to Professor Dr. Friedhelm Pfeiffer for his valuable feedback and suggestions on
this thesis.
I am also deeply grateful to my coauthors, Dr. Jan Hogrefe and Dr. Esther Perez for all
the time we spent together and extensive discussion during the period of the thesis. It
was a great pleasure to work with them, and I look forward to further collaboration.
This thesis is the result of a six-year work at the University of Mannheim and the Univer-
sity of Birmingham. I wish to thank various people for their contribution to this research
work; Professor Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden for his tremendous effort in our graduate
school and constructive feedback in the PhD seminars; Professor Philip Jung, Dr. Daniel
Harenberg, Dr. Martin Scheffel and Matthias Mand for the technical support and all the
discussion and meetings lasting several hours; Dr. Helga Gebauer, Dr. Sandro Holzheimer
and Ms Marion Lehnert, for their excellent administrative work and continuously avail-
ability, even after I moved out of Mannheim.
I am particularly grateful for my friends and colleagues, Dr. Xiaojian Zhao, Dr. Qingwei
Wang, Dr. Qianying Chen, Qiang Guo and Xu Liu, for sharing their brilliant insights on
economics and social science.
I wish to acknowledge our graduate school, Center for Doctoral Studies in Economics, at
University of Mannheim for the financial support during my PhD study, and Department
of Economics, University of Birmingham for offering me a Teaching Fellow position in my
last year of PhD study.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the support provided by my family during the years
of this research work. My parents, Yuping Chen and Yufeng Yao, for believing in me.
My husband, Dr. Pei Kuang, for standing by me. My son, Felix Sihan Kuang, for never
stopping loving me.
Yao Yao
Contents
1 General Introduction 1
2 Labor Income Risk in Germany 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Estimation of the Labor Income Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4.2 Estimation Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5.1 Labor Income Risk Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5.2 Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5.3 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.A Descriptive Statistics and First Stage Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.B Estimates of Income Risk and Standard Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.C Weighted and Unweighted Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 Offshoring and Labor Income Risk: an Empirical Investigation 33
v
vi CONTENTS
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 Estimation and Calculation of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.1 Estimating Labor Income Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.2 Data and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2.3 Income Risk: Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2.4 Measuring the Offshoring Intensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3 Econometric Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4 Results: Offshoring and Income Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4.1 Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4.2 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.5 Conclusion and Welfare Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4 Can Institutional Reform Reduce Job Destruction and Unemployment
Duration? Yes, It Can 57
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2 Inflows and Durations: The Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.3.1 Equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.3.2 Model’s predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.4 Estimating the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.4.1 Data and Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.4.3 Policy Implications from Some Illustrative Simulations . . . . . . . 73
4.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Chapter 1
General Introduction
This thesis consists of three essays on labor markets with focus of idiosyncratic labor in-
come risk, its link to trade openness and unemployment inflows and durations. The second
chapter, the first essay, is joint work with Tom Krebs. We decompose labor income uncer-
tainty into permanent and transitory income risk using micro data in Germany, where the
study on idiosyncratic labor income risk is inadequately documented so far. Permanent
income risk is defined as variance of shocks to income that do not fade out over time and
are assumed to be not self-insurable. The permanent income risk can be accumulated
during the whole working life of individuals, and consists of the stochastic trend of indi-
vidual’s future income.
Much of the literature finds that the nature of income risk, in particular, the nature of
permanent income risk, has profound effects on the consumption-savings decision of in-
dividuals, which in turn plays a central role in individual welfare. The pioneering study
of Aiyagari (1994) shows that income risk has influence on the determination of wealth
inequality and income taxation, when individuals cannot fully insure away their idiosyn-
cratic risks and can only self-insure by borrowing and lending money. Deaton (1991)
provides an analysis that the ability of individuals to self-insure and the precautionary
saving motives are sensitive to the feature of microeconomic labor income process and
income uncertainty. Constantinides and Duffie (1996) argue that idiosyncratic income
risk has impact on the asset pricing and could explains risk premium in a specification
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using power utility. Moreover, Krusell and Smith (1999) and Krebs (2003) claim that
idiosyncratic income risk causes the welfare cost of business cycles.
We follow the estimation method in Krebs, Krishna, and Maloney (2010) employing com-
plete set of moment conditions for permanent income risk, which leads us deviating from
existing literature estimating idiosyncratic income risk in Germany. The income measure
used is individual annual earning. We provide several stylized facts about idiosyncratic
income risk in Germany over the recent three decades. Firstly, the risk to individual earn-
ing is more transitory rather than persistent. Both permanent and transitory income risk
demonstrate an upward trend after the early 1990, the German reunification time, and
this uptrend seems to cease around the year 2000. It implies that the main driving force
of increasing trend in permanent income risk is due to the German reunification, instead
of continuously growing trade activities. Besides, we also discover that East German
residents and females are two groups with considerably higher income risks, compared to
West Germans and males, respectively. Moreover, education might bring more income
uncertainty.
The third chapter, the second essay, analyzes how increased offshoring impacts on idiosyn-
cratic labor income risk. This is a joint work with Jan Hogrefe. It provides an assessment
that directly connects labor income risk and offshoring trends in a panel setting at the
industry level. We are also the first to conduct such an investigation for Germany; a large
trading economy with exceptional reliance on international integration.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, the unpredictable part of individual income
is estimated as the residual term from wage regressions based on individual-level data.
Second, values for permanent income risk at the sector level are estimated as the variance
of persistent shocks to this unpredictable component. We link these to offshoring in a
panel framework in step three. Offshoring at the sector level is understood as the amount
of intermediate inputs imported from the same industry abroad divided by industry out-
put. We do not distinguish between within-firm versus arm’s length transactions as we
consider our offshoring variable to approximate the outcome of any make-or-buy decision.
3We do, however, treat offshoring to non-OECD countries with special attention since this
is usually the type of production relocation which stirs up the most anxiety among the
public. It is also the type of cost-savings driven offshoring modeled in most of the theo-
retical literature on the topic.
We find an increase in offshoring in a given sector correlates with a decrease in permanent
income risk in that sector. Offshoring to non-OECD countries has a particularly strong
impact. We attribute this offshoring related decline in income risk to the fact that, in
countries with relatively rigid labor markets, firms tend to offshore volatile production
intensive parts of their undertakings which leaves the remaining tasks less volatile on
average. Overall, a decrease in income risk provides a channel through which offshoring
can be welfare enhancing.
In the last chapter, the third essay, is a joint work with Esther Perez. Here we read search
theory’s unemployment equilibrium condition as an Iso-Unemployment Curve (IUC). A
country’s position along the curve reveals its preferences over the destruction-duration
mix. Using a panel of 20 OECD countries over 1985-2008, we distinguish two types of
labor markets, dynamic labor market displaying higher turnover rate of workers, and
stagnant labor market with lower turnover rate.
One fundamental question raised is whether dynamic labor markets significantly outper-
form more stagnant ones. Furthermore, is high unemployment inflow rates with short
unemployment durations a better combination (in terms of unemployment rate), com-
pared to limited unemployment inflows and longer unemployment spells? We find that
labor market institutions plays different roles on unemployment inflows and durations. In
particularly, the employment protection legislation to have opposing effects on destruc-
tions and durations, while the effects of the remaining key institutional factors on both
variables tend to reinforce each other. Implementing the right reforms could reduce job
destruction rates by about 0.05 to 0.25 percentage points and shorten unemployment
spells by around 10 to 60 days. Correspondingly, unemployment rates declines as well.
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Chapter 2
Labor Income Risk in Germany
2.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the estimation of labor income risk and its time trend in Ger-
many over the last three decades. We address two questions in this chapter. Firstly,
how volatile has innovative labor income been in Germany since the early 1980s? We
distinguish between two types of idiosyncratic labor income risk: permanent and tran-
sitory. The permanent component must be considered when agents make decisions of
future consumption and asset holdings and therefore has substantial effects on individual
welfare. In contrast, transitory component can be self-insured by saving and dis-saving
and thus has less effect on consumption smoothing and individual welfare. We model the
stochastic individual labor income process and specify and estimate the two components
in order to quantitatively analyze permanent and transitory idiosyncratic income risk in
Germany over the last three decades. Secondly, apart from most existing literature, we
estimate time-dependent idiosyncratic labor income risk, which allows us to examine how
estimated labor income risk evolves over the last thirty years. German reunification in
1990 is the first special feature of this time period. Alongside this was the rapid expansion
of trade volume between Germany and the rest of the world. The reunification and trade
globalization would be potential driving forces of any time pattern of individual labor
income risk that emerges over this thirty year period.
5
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Much of the literature on heterogeneous-agent models has shown the importance of dis-
tinguishing between permanent and transitory income risk and estimating idiosyncratic
labor market income risk. In this type of model, individuals maximize expected life time
utility by choosing consumption and asset holdings for each period, given idiosyncratic
labor income risk and the lack of perfect insurance to insure the risk away. Hence, the
patterns of idiosyncratic labor income risk have profound effects on the consumption-
savings decision of individuals, as well as on individual welfare. Aiyagari (1994) examines
the influence of individual labor income risk on wealth inequality. Moreover, Krebs (2003,
2007)shows the welfare relevance of idiosyncratic income risk. A reduction in uninsur-
able idiosyncratic labor income risk increases human capital investment and welfare by
a significant amount. A quantitative analysis has been conducted by Krebs, Krishna,
and Maloney (2010) and Kuhn (2013). Individuals are willing to give up a large amount
of consumption (and therefore lose individual welfare) in return for avoiding an increase
in income risk. Furthermore, the amount of consumption given up by agents becomes
stronger if they are more risk averse. In all, when permanent income risk is present,
welfare losses under incomplete insurance market are substantial and the welfare gain is
non-negligible when persistent income risk is removed.
Besides the quantitative investigation of idiosyncratic income risk, we are also interested
in its time pattern in recent decades. German reunification was a unique and huge shock
to the labor market and the German economy in general. After the fall of the Berlin Wall,
there was substantial turbulence, labor force flows and migration between the two regions
of Germany. Big changes happened before and after the event. As Fuchs-Schuendeln,
Krueger, and Sommer (2010) pointed out, there exists large differences in labor income
and income inequality prior and subsequent to the reunification. Before the reunification,
income grew at healthy rate, and there was no rising income inequality. In contrast,
income has grown much more slowly and income inequality started to go up after the re-
unification. In this chapter, we examine the remaining and lasting effect of reunification
on income uncertainty in the German labor market using our measure of labor income risk.
On the other hand, the globalization has been proceeded at a rapid rate as the trade
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volume has expanded. To illustrate the globalization process in Germany, we measure
trade openness using the exports and imports of goods and services as proportion of GDP
as plotted for the last three decades in figure 2.1. The exports and imports share of GDP
in Germany declined slightly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and has been continu-
ously rising from the early 1990s to 2011, except for one drop during the recent crisis in
around 2009. Notably, the exports share has increased from about 20 percent at the time
of reunification to above 40 percent in 2011, and imports share, which is at lower level
than exports share at all times, has grown from less than 20 percent to about 35 percent.
The observation in figure 2.1 motivates our second research question as how idiosyncratic
income risk evolves in a more open economy. The trade literature has conducted both
theoretical and empirical analysis on the correlation between trade openness and income
volatility. For example, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) present a theoretical frame-
work in which trade can reallocate tasks with different income volatilities among different
countries. Furthermore, Krebs, Krishna, and Maloney (2010) and Hogrefe and Yao (2012)
provide empirical evidence that trade openness can either positively or negatively related
to idiosyncratic income risk.
A large body of the literature has analyzed the difference in labor market performance pre-
and post-reunification, how trade openness and financial globalization affect wages and
employment, and provided theoretical and empirical findings on both aspects. The value
added in this chapter is that we focus on a less mentioned but nevertheless important
aspect of the labor market: that is, the stochastic individual labor income process and in
particular the evolution of idiosyncratic labor income risk over the last three decades.
Idiosyncratic labor income risk in the US has been broadly studied in the existing liter-
ature. Nevertheless, the stylized facts concerning labor income risk in the German labor
market are less well-documented so far. This chapter aims to provide more empirical
findings on idiosyncratic labor income risk in Germany, employing a relatively complete
set of moment conditions to generate plausible estimates, particularly of permanent risk,
using German Socio-Economic Panel Study (henceforth GSOEP) data.
8 CHAPTER 2. LABOR INCOME RISK IN GERMANY
Figure 2.1: Trade globalization in Germany
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we review the existing
literature on idiosyncratic income risk. We then describe our data selection in section 2.3.
The empirical model is specified in section 4.3, and section 2.5 summarizes our empirical
findings. We finally conclude in section 4.5.
2.2 Literature Review
Working with Panel Study of Income Dynamics (henceforth PSID) data, a bulk of research
estimates the idiosyncratic income risk in the US. For instance, Carroll and Samwick
(1997) provide a fundamental method for estimating time-independent individual income
risk. They define income risk as the variance of (unpredictable) changes of income, and
disentangle permanent and transitory components. The estimated permanent income risk
is 14.5% and the transitory risk is approximately 21% in the US over a 1981-1987 sample
period.
Another study by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) asks how idiosyncratic income
risk varies over the business cycle. They conclude that permanent income risk is strongly
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countercyclical, and find that estimates of persistent income risk are roughly 21% in a
recession and 12% in an expansion. On top of permanent and transitory income risk,
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) add a third component, measurement error in the income
process, which has partial persistent power. They treat this measurement error as an
MA(q) process, and model labor income as a parsimonious ARCH process with both ob-
servable and unobserved heterogeneity.
Besides the study of labor income risk in the US, Krebs, Krishna, and Maloney (2010)
develop a GMM estimation of income risk, using longitudinal quarterly data of Mexican
workers in 21 different industries. They find that the annualized permanent income risk
in Mexico is around 18% but it varies among different manufacturing sectors.
Meanwhile, there has been much less study of income risk based on micro data for the
German labor market. Fuchs-Schuendeln, Krueger, and Sommer (2010) estimate the
transitory and permanent income risk to the innovative wage rate and household labor
income. They extract transitory risk from the covariance of growth rate of individual
labor incomes, and specify a permanent component by eliminating the transitory part
from the variance of the growth rate. They report the average permanent income risk in
Germany from early 1980s to late 1990s as 12.7%, and higher transitory income risk than
permanent income risk and a slight upward trend of permanent income risk during the
1990s.
Gernandt and Pfeiffer (2007) investigate the evolution of wage inequality in East and West
Germany, especially after German reunification. Their findings are that rising inequality
emerges in the East and West, but with different characteristics. There is higher degree
of wage inequality in lower part of the wage distribution in West Germany, while in the
upper part of the wage distribution in East Germany.
In this chapter, we follow and extend the estimation method in Krebs, Krishna, and
Maloney (2010). That is, we adopt a more complete set of moment conditions including
the growth rate(, which is used in Fuchs-Schuendeln, Krueger, and Sommer (2010)), as
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well as moment conditions of higher order differences, such that we specify the component
of innovative individual income with a high degree of persistence, that is, with welfare
relevance. More details on the estimation procedure are presented in section 4.3.
2.3 Data
The data used in this study are drawn from the 1983-2010 GSOEP. The GSOEP is a
longitudinal survey of private households and individuals in Germany. It has a similar
structure to PSID, which is widely used in various topics of economic research. We include
all subsamples in GSOEP except for the ’Oversampling of high income’ subsample which
is eliminated to minimize potential selection bias. We concentrate on analyzing household
heads, the main earner in the household between 25 and years of age 60, which is assumed
to be the working period of individuals in the data. The labor income measure employed
is individual annual earnings, which is defined as the summation of wages and salaries
from all employment including training, primary and secondary jobs and self-employment,
plus income from bonuses, over-time, and profit sharing. Moreover, we eliminate indi-
viduals with too low hourly wage rate (less than 3 euros per hour) in order to minimize
measurement error by ruling out implausibly low income. Lastly, self-employed people are
not included. In GSOEP, self-employed people report capital and labor income together
as individual earnings. We exclude self-employment, as we focus on the labor income of
individuals.
In GSOEP, East Germany (the previous German Democratic Republic, GDR) joins the
West (officially, the Federal Republic of Germany) in the year 1991. Therefore, our 1983
to 2011 sample allows us to investigate if there is any remaining impact of reunification
on idiosyncratic labor income risk in East and West 20 years after this unique event.
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2.4 Estimation of the Labor Income Risk
2.4.1 The Model
In this chapter, labor income risk is defined as the unpredictability of income and refers
to income variability from an ex ante perspective. Therefore, labor income risk arises
whenever a person’s future income deviates from their expectation and it is idiosyncratic
to them. In general, this could happen during the whole working period of an individual.
In this sense, labor income risk is estimated as the variance of the unpredictable part of
individual income. It can be divided into two components: permanent income risk and
transitory income risk. Permanent income risk consists of the stochastic trend of innova-
tive income and has persistent power over the remaining length of working life, while its
transitory counterpart follows a random white noise process and is defined as the devia-
tion of income from a stochastic trend. Hence, individuals consume a certain proportion
of a permanent shock rather than a transitory one. Permanent risk has a considerable
effect on future consumption and asset holdings, as well as individual welfare.
The innovative individual income is derived from a standard Mincerian type regression
model, where each individual generates her expectations about future income from a
projection based upon her observables and predictable characteristics.
Consider the following equation of individual labor income i in time t:
yit = αt +Xitβt + uit (2.1)
yit is logarithm of our measure of labor income, individual annual earnings. The constant
αt captures the effect of aggregate shocks on individual earnings, e.g. oil price shocks and
business cycle effects. Xit is a vector of all observables and demographic characteristics of
individuals: gender, age, experience, region, family size, education and experience. βt are
year-specific coefficients. The expected return to individual characteristics is identical for
all individuals in the same period but could change over time. For instance, education is
found to have a higher return on individual labor income in recent years because of global
technological progress. uit is the stochastic part of individual labor income, which is id-
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iosyncratic and unpredictable ex ante. The first-stage Mincerian regression (2.1) provides
the estimated parameters αˆt, βˆt and predicts the residuals uˆit.
We make further assumptions on the residuals uit so that it can be decomposed into the
permanent component ωit and a transitory innovation it. The permanent component ωit
is assumed to be a random walk without drift.
uit = ωit + it (2.2)
ωit = ωit−1 + ηit (2.3)
Moreover, we suppose ηit and it are time dependently distributed, that is,
ηit ∼ N(0, σ2η,t) (2.4)
it ∼ N(0, σ2,t) (2.5)
We assume that both the permanent and transitory shock ηit and it are i.i.d. across
agents, and that ηit and it are independent with each other at all leads and lags, i.e.
cov(ηit, ηis) = 0, ∀t 6= s, cov(it, is) = 0,∀t 6= s, cov(ηit, is) = 0,∀t, s. The standard devia-
tions ση,t and σ,t of the permanent shock ηit and the transitory shock it are the measures
of permanent and transitory income risks. They are time-varying, such that individuals
face different income risks in each year.
2.4.2 Estimation Method
We follow closely the estimation procedure in Krebs, Krishna, and Maloney (2010), and
extend it to panel data with a longer time dimension. From equations (2.2) and (2.3)
above, the n-year difference of uit can be expressed as
4nuit = uit+n − uit = ηit+1 + ...+ ηit+n + it+n − it (2.6)
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Then the variance of 4nuit is given by
V [4nuit] = σ2η,t−1 + ...+ σ2η,t−n + σ2,t + σ2,t−n (2.7)
We estimate (2.7) by minimizing the sum of squared distance between the moment con-
ditions in the model and the corresponding moments in the data. Put differently, we run
an OLS regression of (2.7), where V [4nuit] is the dependent variable with observations
Vˆ [4nuˆit], while the right hand side is a combination of σ2η,t and σ2,t with varying n and t.
If σ2η,t or σ2,t is included in a particular V [4nuit], we put 1 at the corresponding position
of independent variable. If not, we put 0 instead. This makes our independent variables
with observation 1 or 0 and with coefficients σ2η,t or σ2,t. We have a sufficiently number of
observations of V [4nuit] because the time period in our data is long enough. Then the
OLS estimators σˆ2η,t and σˆ2,t are unbiased estimates of σ2η,t and σ2,t .
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Labor Income Risk Estimates
Table 2.1: Average of estimated labor income risk
Region Subgroups Average estimates of Average estimates of
transitory risk permanent risk
All all 0.3038 0.1078
West Female 0.3620 0.1208
Male 0.2416 0.1031
East Female 0.4185 0.1625
Male 0.3064 0.1048
Male in High School dropouts 0.2867 0.1241
West High School graduates 0.2445 0.0785
College graduates 0.1827 0.0975
We summarize the labor income risk estimates in this section. Table 2.1 presents the av-
erage over time of estimates of transitory and permanent income risk to individual labor
income using GSOEP data according to different subgroups. For all individuals in our
sample, as shown in the upper part of table 2.1 the permanent income risk to individual
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labor income has a mean value of 10.78% between 1985 and 20081, while the transitory
labor income risk is approximately 30% on average over the same period. To interpret,
an individual who earns the average labor income, i.e. 30,000 euros per year, faces an
average of permanent shock of 10.78% or 3000 euros, between 1985 and 2008.
Furthermore, we classify our sample into several subgroups, that is, males in the West,
females in the West, males in the East and females in the East, and look at the labor
income risk in those subgroups separately in order to investigate the region and gender
difference in idiosyncratic labor income risk. In the middle part of table 2.1, we display
the average estimated permanent and transitory income risk in these subgroups over time.
As we see in table 2.1, estimated labor income risk differs substantially between East and
West Germany. The permanent and transitory labor income risks in East Germany are
higher for both females and males than in the West. The average transitory income risk
for females in the East is almost 42% and average permanent income risk is 16%, while
transitory income risk is a bit higher than 36% for females in the West, and permanent
risk is approximately 12% for the West females. Males have transitory income risk of
nearly 31% and permanent income risk of about 10.48% in the East, while males in the
West have transitory risk of 24% and permanent risk of 10.31% to individual earning in
the West.
We are not the first to observe the different patterns of the micro labor income process
in the East and West. Fuchs-Schuendeln, Krueger, and Sommer (2010) report that the
increase in income inequality is much stronger in the East than in the West, and that
there exists a convergence of income inequality in males between East and West. Inter-
estingly, we find that the gap of labor income risk is smaller for males than for females
when comparing East and West residents.
On the other hand, females have more income uncertainty than males in both regions.
1We drop estimates in the first two and the last two years, as we need further assumptions to specify
the yearly estimates in those years.
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Precisely, females have about 12% more transitory income risk, and about 2% more per-
manent income risk than males in West Germany, while females have around 11% higher
of transitory income risk and about 6% higher of permanent income risk than males in
East Germany. Much of the literature has found that females have quite different labor
participation decisions compared to males. Their labor supply is more sensitive to their
marital status, the presence of young children, home productivity, tax incentives etc. As
observed (e.g. in U.S. Census Bureau, International Statistics (2012)), the marriage rate
has declined and the divorce rate has increased over the last several decades in Germany.
Not surprisingly, there has been notable increase in single-parent households over this
time. All these facts can be associated with the higher income volatility of females in our
sample.
In addition, we allow for education-specific differences when estimating idiosyncratic in-
come risk. In order to disentangle the effect of education on labor income risk from the
effect of region and gender, we classify males in the West into three groups according
to their education level with respect to high school, namely, high school dropouts, high
school graduates including other equivalent diplomas, and college graduates which in-
cludes people with degrees more advanced than high school.
High school graduates not receiving more education or training have the lowest permanent
risk, compared to high school dropouts and college graduates. Consider a typical high
school graduate who receives the necessary training and stays in the same job role for most
of her working life; the income risk for her is relatively low. However for a college graduate
who has more skill and is more adaptive and flexible to new jobs and positions, the excess
volatility of labor income possibly originates from switching jobs or obtaining promotion.
In the meantime, people with limited training, say, without high school graduation or
enough professional training, mostly work part-time or short term. Therefore, the income
process of high school dropouts exhibits greater fluctuations. This observation implies
that an increase of human capital investment does not necessarily reduce the uninsurable
income risk.
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Figure 2.2: Time trend of estimated labor income risk
Note: In the upper diagrams, the hollow dots represent the estimated variance of transitory
components, solid dots are the estimated yearly variance of permanent components, and the solid and
dashed lines are the corresponding HP filtered trend components of transitory and permanent
estimates. In the lower diagrams, solid and hollow dots show correspondingly the estimated variance of
one-year and 5-year differences of residual incomes generated from the first stage regression.
2.5.2 Main Results
Figure 2.2 illustrates the time trend of estimated idiosyncratic labor income risk between
1985 and 2008. In the upper panel of figure 2.2 we plot the estimates of permanent and
transitory labor income risk for males in the West and for all agents in the West. The
hollow dots represent the estimated variance of transitory components, solid dots are the
estimated yearly variance of permanent components, and the solid and dashed lines are
the corresponding HP filtered trend components of transitory and permanent estimates.
The lower panel in figure 2.2 presents the estimated variance of one-year and 5-year differ-
ences of residual incomes generated from the first stage regression, Vˆ [41uˆit] and Vˆ [45uˆit],
for males in the West and for all agents in the West. Details on the yearly estimates and
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Figure 2.3: Time trend of estimated labor income risk
Note: In the upper diagrams, the hollow dots represent the estimated variance of transitory
components, solid dots are the estimated yearly variance of permanent components, and the solid and
dashed lines are the corresponding HP filtered trend components of transitory and permanent
estimates. In the lower diagrams, solid and hollow dots show correspondingly the estimated variance of
one-year and 5-year differences of residual incomes generated from the first stage regression.
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corresponding standard errors can be found in appendix 2.B.
Due to the limited number of years in the sample prior to the 1990s, there is no clear
pattern shown in the estimates of transitory and permanent components, as well as in the
estimated variances of the first and fifth differences of residual income. However, clearer
time patterns emerge after the early 1990s in our estimates. For males in the West, tran-
sitory income risk, variance of the 5-year and 1-year difference of residual incomes have
started to rise since early 1990, the post reunification period for Germany, until the year
2000. In the meanwhile, yearly estimated variances of permanent components exhibit a
moderate yet increasing trend which terminates around the year 2000. Increases in per-
manent income risk are accumulated year after year and eventually lead to a substantial
effect on individual consumption-saving decisions as well as individual welfare, given the
persistence of permanent income risk.
The observation that income risk increases after reunification, and that there is an end
in the uptrend of permanent income risk after the year 2000, implies that the adjustment
process after reunification is wearing off over time, and that the increasing trend (which is
similarly observed by Fuchs-Schuendeln, Krueger, and Sommer (2010) is no longer there.
This seems to be the leftover turbulence after reunification. Once the process is over,
the trend changes. The unique event of reunification in Germany tends to increase both
transitory and permanent income risks for residents in the West, but the effect of reuni-
fication on our measure of income risk reecks one decade after the event.
In the mean time, export and import shares of GDP have been continuously rising, except
for one drop during the recently crisis. We can conclude that the earlier uptrend is due
to turmoil after the reunification, not because of globalization. Hence, for our measure of
labor income risk, no effect is observed due to globalization or the increasing activities of
exports or imports.
As we can see in the plot for all agents in the West (the right diagrams in figure 2.2),
transitory income risk, variance of 5-year difference of residuals and variance of 1-year
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difference of residual incomes have similar trends, compared to males in the West. These
three yearly estimates started to rise from the early 1990 until around the year 2000.
However, there are more fluctuations in the estimated variance of permanent compo-
nents, which might be because of the female counterpart in our sample.
We further compare males and females in the West in order to estimate the gender dif-
ferences in the time trend. The result is shown in figure 2.3. Compared to males in the
West, females in the West seem to have no clear trend of permanent income risk, the
welfare-relevant income risk. The time trend of the estimated variance of fifth differences
of residual incomes reinforces the finding for males in the West that variance has increased
after reunification until around the year 2000, and a decreasing trend seems to emerge
afterwards. The impact of reunification works in a different way for males in the East,
as we observe that permanent income risk declines over time and that there is no clear
trend in transitory income risk for males in East Germany. Furthermore, there seems
to be no uptrend in permanent income risk in the West before reunification. Moreover,
reunification seems to increase transitory risk to labor income as well.
2.5.3 Robustness
We further test the robustness of our results by adjusting the estimation sample, and we
focus on the time trend of estimates of permanent income risk. We firstly eliminate the
minimum hourly wage rate threshold of agents’ earnings, that is, we include all household
heads who are not self-employed and between age 25 and 60 regardless of their labor
income. The estimation results without the minimum wage threshold are shown in figure
2.4. Similar estimates of permanent and transitory labor income risk and the variance of
1-year and 5-year differences of residual incomes emerge. Firstly, there is an increasing
trend of transitory and permanent income risks during the 1990s for males and all agents
in the West when excluding the minimum wage threshold. Secondly, the increasing trend
seems to be discontinuous after around the year 2000.
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We then take self-employment into the sample, such that we include all household heads
who are between the age of 25 and 60 and earn a credible hourly wage rate, regardless of
whether they are self-employed. Estimates of labor income risk and variance of differences
are plotted in figure 2.5. For males in the West, the uptrend of permanent income risk
seems to be less clear compared to other data selection criteria, however, it still shows
that there is a halt to increasing labor income risk after the year 2000, and even the
beginning of a decline. For all agents in the West, the right panel of figure 2.5, there
are more fluctuations of estimated permanent income risk, as the income of self-employed
includes their capital income which incorporates more volatile sources of income.
Finally, we drop one of the regressors, years of education, in our first stage regression, in
order that we could examine if the time trend of estimated labor income risk relies on
the choice of the independent variables in our first stage regression (2.1). For males in
the West, the increasing trend in 1990s and its subsequent expiration are still observed in
figure 2.6.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter decomposes idiosyncratic income risk into permanent and transitory com-
ponents and estimates the annual transitory and permanent income risks in Germany
over the last three decades. We assume that there are two shocks to individual earnings,
transitory and permanent shocks, where the permanent shock is the stochastic trend of
income and has persistence over the remaining working period of individuals. The stan-
dard deviation of permanent and transitory shocks serve as our measures of permanent
and transitory income risk. This chapter focuses on estimation of permanent income risk
and its recent time trend.
We find that the average estimated permanent labor income risk in Germany between
1985 and 2008 is about 11%, and that average of transitory income risk is approximately
30% over the same time period. Individuals in East Germany face a more volatile in-
come process compared to those in West Germany, and male household heads have lower
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Figure 2.4: Time trend of labor income risk without minimum wage threshold
Note: In the upper diagrams, the hollow dots represent the estimated variance of transitory
components, solid dots are the estimated yearly variance of permanent components, and the solid and
dashed lines are the corresponding HP filtered trend components of transitory and permanent
estimates. In the lower diagrams, solid and hollow dots show correspondingly the estimated variance of
one-year and 5-year differences of residual incomes generated from the first stage regression.
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Figure 2.5: Time trend of labor income risk including self-employment
Note: In the upper diagrams, the hollow dots represent the estimated variance of transitory
components, solid dots are the estimated yearly variance of permanent components, and the solid and
dashed lines are the corresponding HP filtered trend components of transitory and permanent
estimates. In the lower diagrams, solid and hollow dots show correspondingly the estimated variance of
one-year and 5-year differences of residual incomes generated from the first stage regression.
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Figure 2.6: Labor income risk without education in the first stage regression
Note: In the upper diagrams, the hollow dots represent the estimated variance of transitory
components, solid dots are the estimated yearly variance of permanent components, and the solid and
dashed lines are the corresponding HP filtered trend components of transitory and permanent
estimates. In the lower diagrams, solid and hollow dots show correspondingly the estimated variance of
one-year and 5-year differences of residual incomes generated from the first stage regression.
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income risks than females. Interestingly, education could bring more risk to individual
earnings. We also observe that permanent labor income risk in Germany has an upward
trend after the early 1990s, the post German reunification period, and the uptrend seems
to cease around the year 2000. This implies that the growing permanent income risk
during the 1990s could be mainly driven by turbulence in labor market in the wake of
reunification rather than the process of globalization. It implies that the German labor
market remained stable during rapidly growing trading activities in world markets.
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2.A Descriptive Statistics and First Stage Regression
Table 2.A.1 displays the descriptive statistics of variables in our sample, and figure 2.A.1
and 2.A.2 show the time trend of means and medians of real and nominal earnings in
our sample. We also compare our means and medians to the real and nominal earnings
reported by the Federal Statistical Office in Germany. In figure 2.A.1 and 2.A.2, the solid
line represents connected means of real and nominal monthly labor income, the dashed
line shows connected medians of real and nominal monthly labor income, the dash-dot
line is the plot of average real and nominal monthly labor income reported by the Fed-
eral Statistical Office starting from early 1990s. As one can see, our sample demonstrate
similar time trend to what German Federal Statistical Office reports, that is, there was a
significant drop after reunification for real earning and a relative moderate but still con-
siderable drop for nominal earnings in Germany. Average real earnings hadn’t increasing
during 1990s, and declined further after the year 2000. The average nominal earnings
seem to grow smoothly during 1990s, and have slowed down after 2000.
Table 3.A.1 shows the regression results from the first stage Mincerian wage equation
regression in the year 2005, from which the corresponding residuals are generated. The
regression results in the other years look virtually the same, in the sense that all coeffi-
cients have the expected signs and significance. Put differently, individual labor income
grows with age, education and family size.
Table 2.A.1: Descriptive statistics of our sample (1983-2010)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max
Family size 2.831017 1.338483 1 14
Years of education 12.09746 2.709664 7 18
Ind. working hrs 2043.418 642.8531 13 5965
Ind. earning 30069.63 20386.59 56.5213 1774492
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Figure 2.A.1: Mean and median of real income
Note: the solid line represents connected means of real monthly labor income, the dashed line shows
connected medians of real monthly labor income, the dash-dot line is the plot of average real monthly
labor income reported by the German Federal Statistical Office.
Table 2.A.2: First stage wage regression for year 2005
ln individual labor income coefficients
Age 0.1076 ***
( 0.0095)
Age-squared -0.1069***
( 0.0110)
Family size 0.0311***
(0.0079)
Years of education 0.0987***
(0.0034)
Constant 5.8062***
(0.1996)
Observations 5623
R-squared 0.3015
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Figure 2.A.2: Mean and median of nominal income
Note: the solid line represents connected means of nominal monthly labor income, the dashed line
shows connected medians of nominal monthly labor income, the dash-dot line is the plot of average
nominal monthly labor income reported by the German Federal Statistical Office.
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2.B Estimates of Income Risk and Standard Errors
In table 2.B.1 and 2.B.2, we report our yearly estimated variances of transitory and
permanent components of residual incomes, and the corresponding standard errors, for
all agents in the West and only males in the West. Table 2.B.3 shows the estimated
variance of one-year and 5-year differences of residual incomes for all agents in the West
and males in the West.
Table 2.B.1: Estimation results : All agents in the West
Year Estimates of transitory (standard errors) Estimates of permanent (standard errors)
components components
1985 0.064 (0.012) 0.000 (0.021)
1986 0.053 (0.010) 0.021 (0.016)
1987 0.054 (0.009) -0.009 (0.013)
1988 0.075 (0.008) 0.013 (0.012)
1989 0.084 (0.008) -0.012 (0.011)
1990 0.081 (0.007) -0.011 (0.010)
1991 0.065 (0.007) 0.027 (0.010)
1992 0.085 (0.007) 0.000 (0.010)
1993 0.086 (0.007) 0.003 (0.009)
1994 0.117 (0.007) 0.007 (0.009)
1995 0.136 (0.007) 0.007 (0.009)
1996 0.101 (0.006) 0.032 (0.009)
1997 0.095 (0.006) 0.029 (0.009)
1998 0.136 (0.007) -0.001 (0.009)
1999 0.110 (0.007) 0.043 (0.009)
2000 0.137 (0.007) 0.018 (0.009)
2001 0.014 (0.009) 0.108 (0.007)
2002 0.079 (0.007) 0.009 (0.010)
2003 0.089 (0.007) 0.031 (0.010)
2004 0.089 (0.008) 0.029 (0.010)
2005 0.090 (0.008) 0.006 (0.011)
2006 0.089 (0.009) 0.038 (0.012)
2007 0.086 (0.010) 0.009 (0.013)
2008 0.072 (0.012) 0.038 (0.016)
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Table 2.B.2: Estimation results : Males in the West
Year Estimates of transitory (standard errors) Estimates of permanent (standard errors)
components components
1985 0.060 (0.010) -0.002 (0.017)
1986 0.041 (0.008) 0.024 (0.013)
1987 0.026 (0.007) 0.005 (0.011)
1988 0.034 (0.007) 0.020 (0.010)
1989 0.041 (0.006) 0.003 (0.009)
1990 0.037 (0.006) 0.000 (0.009)
1991 0.031 (0.006) 0.022 (0.008)
1992 0.040 (0.006) -0.001 (0.008)
1993 0.049 (0.006) 0.008 (0.008)
1994 0.079 (0.005) 0.012 (0.007)
1995 0.085 (0.005) 0.015 (0.007)
1996 0.065 (0.005) 0.017 (0.007)
1997 0.068 (0.005) 0.012 (0.007)
1998 0.085 (0.005) 0.017 (0.007)
1999 0.073 (0.005) 0.023 (0.007)
2000 0.098 (0.006) 0.010 (0.007)
2001 0.077 (0.006) -0.006 (0.008)
2002 0.056 (0.006) -0.002 (0.008)
2003 0.052 (0.006) 0.025 (0.008)
2004 0.061 (0.006) 0.014 (0.009)
2005 0.066 (0.007) 0.005 (0.009)
2006 0.055 (0.007) 0.014 (0.010)
2007 0.063 (0.008) 0.013 (0.011)
2008 0.056 (0.010) 0.008 (0.013)
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Table 2.B.3: Estimated variance of first and fifth differences of uˆit
Year All agents in the West Males in the West
Vˆ [41uˆit] Vˆ [45uˆit] Vˆ [41uˆit] Vˆ [45uˆit]
1986 0.106 0.188 0.098 0.163
1987 0.096 0.174 0.083 0.137
1988 0.115 0.146 0.082 0.117
1989 0.100 0.162 0.077 0.149
1990 0.094 0.169 0.077 0.110
1991 0.109 0.200 0.085 0.137
1992 0.111 0.222 0.079 0.171
1993 0.134 0.244 0.098 0.202
1994 0.163 0.218 0.131 0.159
1995 0.171 0.252 0.133 0.187
1996 0.190 0.316 0.139 0.205
1997 0.153 0.330 0.105 0.220
1998 0.151 0.378 0.107 0.258
1999 0.193 0.343 0.125 0.228
2000 0.178 0.305 0.116 0.193
2001 0.185 0.355 0.136 0.200
2002 0.209 0.319 0.140 0.194
2003 0.161 0.336 0.111 0.202
2004 0.176 0.283 0.119 0.164
2005 0.164 0.278 0.104 0.188
2006 0.169 0.294 0.109 0.161
2007 0.157 0.301 0.116 0.205
2008 0.181 0.338 0.111 0.212
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Figure 2.C.1: Weighted estimation of income risk
2.C Weighted and Unweighted Estimation
Individual weights are usually applied when using micro data in order to match the whole
population. In order to see how sensitive our estimation is to inclusion of weights, we
construct the weighted estimates for income measure as individual labor earnings. The
results are shown in figure 2.C.1.
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Chapter 3
Offshoring and Labor Income Risk:
an Empirical Investigation
3.1 Introduction
Globalization is often perceived as creating a more volatile working environment on the
labor market. In particular, trends such as the relocation of parts of production abroad
(offshoring) induce fears of job loss and higher fluctuations in individual income. While
the long-run level effects of different types of offshoring on income and employment have
been documented by a large literature, see e.g. Feenstra (2010), a lot less academic at-
tention has been paid to the analysis of effects on the variability of incomes. Our paper
further completes the picture of how offshoring has an impact on characteristics of labor
income by estimating its relationship to income risk at the industry level using data from
German manufacturing. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to put the
link between offshoring and income risk at the heart of an empirical analysis.
Income risk is defined as the variance of changes in the unexplained component of indi-
vidual income. As such, it describes changes in income that are not a result of observable
and predictable characteristics like age or education. Crucially, and in line with the liter-
ature, we econometrically distinguish between transitory and permanent risks to income.
Transitory shocks to income are more likely to be smoothed out by self-insurance mecha-
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nisms such as saving and borrowing. However, this does not hold for permanent shocks,
i.e. shocks that permanently shift an individual’s income trajectory. Following the litera-
ture, we assume permanent income risk to be uninsurable from an individual perspective.
Then, unexpected permanent variation in income affects the present value of lifetime
earnings, which impacts on individual welfare (Aiyagari, 1994). It is thus the permanent
component of income shocks we are interested in. Linking offshoring to changes in the
variance of permanent income shocks yields evidence on the effect of offshoring on labor
income which allows for a discussion of welfare consequences.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we derive and estimate measures of income
risk at the industry level. Second, we link it to offshoring. Income risk is estimated
at the industry level from individual income data as the average variance of changes in
the unexplained component of individual income. The latter is retrieved from standard
Mincerian wage regressions. For this first stage we use variation in individual level data
from a sample of official German social security records to estimate industry level income
risk. In the second step, we rely on panel methods, helping us to answer the question of
whether an increase in offshoring over time is correlated with a change in the permanent
component of income risk. The offshoring measures are calculated at the industry level
in a way similar to Feenstra and Hanson (1999). We use detailed yearly import matrices
from input-output tables in combination with output and trade data.
From the outset, it is not clear whether offshoring increases or decreases income risk –
especially with respect to the permanent component. On the one hand, there is empirical
evidence at the industry level that offshoring tends to raise labor demand elasticities,
which could lead to higher income risk, e.g. (Senses, 2010). On the other hand, this
evidence is in part contradicted at finer levels of aggregation. Sascha and Marc-Andreas
(2008) find offshoring to actually lower separation rates in employment at the firm level
and Buch and Lipponer (2010) directly cast doubt on the claim that offshoring is respon-
sible for changes in labor demand elasticities within multinational firms. It is important
to note, however, that most studies within the rather inconclusive empirical literature
are only indirectly related to the concept of income risk, and its permanent component
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in particular. As mentioned above, our analysis specifically tries to address a measure
of “insecurity” that has clear and well-documented welfare implications – a characteristic
generally attributed to the permanent component of income risk.
In addition to the mixed empirical results, theory recently suggested offshoring to be much
less of a specter to workers than what is reflected in public anxiety and job loss fears.
For example, Bergin, Feenstra, and Hanson (2009) show that offshoring has the potential
to exert a dampening effect on economic volatility in the offshoring country if demand
shocks are buffered by excess production activity in offshore plants. In other words, fluc-
tuations are “exported” and firms face a less volatile domestic economic environment;
and potentially their workers do as well.1 It is also possible that offshoring induces what
may be called a “composition effect”. If offshoring is understood as trade in tasks, as
in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), and the tasks as such differ in their specific
income volatilities, the relocation of certain tasks abroad might lead to aggregate changes
in industry level income risk. If the offshored tasks are at the same time more volatile
with respect to income, the average income risk of the tasks remaining onshore falls. A
similar mechanism could arise from different income risk and trade patterns across skill
groups. One could think of this effect as arising from firms effectively insuring themselves
against fluctuations in economic activity. If institutional rigidities in the home market
make adjustment costly, firms would be expected to relocate the activities most affected
in places where adjustment is less costly. Such considerations seem particularly plausible
in light of the European Union’s enlargement to the East and Germany’s location close
to the new EU member states.2
The particular focus on offshoring also sets this paper apart from the recent literature
studying effects on income risk arising from other forms of globalization such as import
competition and tariff reductions. Krebs, Krishna, and Maloney (2010) analyse how tariff
1Yet, the opposite holds true for the receiving country. Volatility abroad (e.g. in Mexico for the case
of US offshoring) is amplified.
2Note that this does not necessarily lead to an aggregate employment loss with less volatile, yet lower,
overall employment at home since offshoring also triggers productivity effects possibly leading to net job
creation (Kohler and Wrona, 2011). Additionally, Wright (2012) shows empirical evidence for output
increases from offshoring.
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reductions and the ensuing integration of the Mexican economy into the world market
(in particular the North American part of it) affected income risk. They show income
risk to increase as a response to trade liberalization, inducing the emergence of negative
welfare effects. Yet, the Mexican economy may be considered a rather special case, in
particular with regard to its proximity to the US and the existence of the “maquiladora”
sector near the northern border.3 Krishna and Senses (2009) set out to find the roots of
income risk in the US labor market. Their prime candidate is import competition, which
they show to raise the permanent component of income risk. As a robustness check these
authors also employ an offshoring-type variable, which shows a negative coefficient in
their estimations. We build on these intriguing insights and additionally put a clear focus
on offshoring to explicitly contrast the concerns about increased risks often raised in the
public debate with the potentially risk smoothing effects of a more efficient international
allocation of production tasks.
Our findings contradict the general impression of offshoring as a major factor in raising
long-run income volatility. They suggest an increase in offshoring is correlated with a
decrease in the permanent component of income risk at the industry level. The effect is
particularly visible for offshoring to non-OECD countries. For instance, a one percentage
point rise in the overall offshoring intensity implies, on average, at least a 40% fall in
permanent income risk compared to its mean value. Looking at offshoring as a particu-
lar type of international trade, we thus find the opposite effect in comparison with other
studies relating more general measures of globalization to permanent income risk.
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section details the approach for estimat-
ing income risk, presents the data we use, and gives further insight into measuring the
offshoring intensity at the industry level. In sections 3.3 and 3.4, we describe in detail
the econometric specification and provide results on how income risk and offshoring are
linked, respectively. A final section discusses potential welfare effects and concludes.
3In fact, this “maquiladora” sector has been shown in Bergin, Feenstra, and Hanson (2009) to have
a particularly high volatility due to its role in the production sharing with the US economy.
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3.2 Estimation and Calculation of Variables
3.2.1 Estimating Labor Income Risk
The approach taken in this chapter involves a two-stage procedure to first estimate the
permanent component of individual income risk (stage one), and subsequently relating it
to carefully constructed offshoring indices at the industry level (stage two). The goal of
this section is to motivate our measure of income risk and to derive the corresponding
estimation procedure. We follow the bulk of the literature and define income risk as the
unpredictability of individual income, while referring to this variability from an ex-ante
perspective (Carroll and Samwick, 1997; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004). As such, income
risk accompanies people whenever their future income is stochastic. In this sense, income
risk is conceptualized as a deviation of the future income stream from its expectation, and
is estimated as the variance of changes in the unexpected component of individual income.
In this chapter, as in most of the related literature, the estimated income risk has two
components: a transitory one and a permanent one. This distinction is important since
the two components have vastly different welfare effects. Transitory risk refers to the
standard deviation of stochastic income changes without persistence. It describes the
standard deviation of the purely random part of residual labor income and has no effect
on the stochastic trend of residual individual earnings. Therefore, it could be effectively
“self-insured” by individuals through saving and borrowing. Such unexpected transitory
variation could be introduced by windfall labor income, extra or unusual (un)employment
in the short-run, or changes in hours worked, which do not persist until the end of an
individual’s working life. Thus, following common theoretical considerations, there are no
reasons for individuals to change their consumption and savings pattern, and therefore
there are hardly any welfare effects (Levine and Zame, 2002). Moreover, in the standard
estimation procedure, measurement error in the data is captured in transitory risk.
For the permanent component of income shocks, however, a different picture emerges.
Permanent income risk, the standard deviation of permanent shocks, has profound effects
on the consumption and savings decision of individuals in environments with imperfect
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insurance possibilities. Permanent income shocks reflect the stochastic trend of income.
These shocks have persistent power over the remaining working period of individuals.
This affects the present value of lifetime earnings and thus individuals “consume out” a
certain amount of permanent shocks. Therefore, and in contrast to transitory risk, perma-
nent income risk has an effect of future consumption and asset holding and, hence, affects
individual welfare (Constantinides and Duffie, 1996; Krebs, 2003). Permanent shocks
are observed as permanent events during workers’ working life – for example, promotion
beyond expectation or changes in employment resulting in a different matching quality
of an individual’s abilities and the job’s requirements. A quantitative welfare analysis
is conducted in Krebs (2003), where a baseline consumption-saving model with hetero-
geneous agents is considered. Individuals have log utility function with degree of risk
aversion 1, and time discount factor is 0.96. In this case, the individual welfare, measured
in equivalent consumption, declines by 1%, if permanent labor income risk increases by 2
percentage points, from 9% to 11%. Furthermore, if the degree of risk aversion rises to 2,
that is, individual are more risk averse, then the cost of consumption-equivalent welfare
is 2%, given the same increase in permanent labor income risk. Kuhn (2013) consider a
more extreme case where half of the persistent income risk is removed. The consumption-
equivalent welfare gain in such an environment with incomplete insurance markets rises
up to 20%. Given this documented welfare effect, we focus our analysis on the connection
between offshoring and the permanent component of labor income risk and disregard the
transitory component. This is the same approach as in Krebs, Krishna, and Maloney
(2010) and Krishna and Senses (2009).
The procedure for estimating the components of income risk starts with the identification
of the unexplained component of individual income. This component is retrieved as the
residual from standard Mincerian wage regressions of the following form:
yit = αjt + βtXijt + uijt (3.2.1)
Note that the regressions are run year-by-year and include fixed effects for industries j.
The control vector Xijt includes the commonly used wage determinants such as age, age
squared, education, marital status, nationality and firm-size as well as 2-digit occupation
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fixed effects. Notice that the estimation allows for changes in the returns to observable
characteristics over time. An increase in the skill premium, for instance, is not regarded
as contributing to income risk. The regressions are run on a restricted sample, which in-
cludes male individuals fully employed in manufacturing industries in West Germany. yit
is the natural logarithm of our income variable for individual i in year t, specified in more
detail in the database descriptions below. The assumptions underlying the above model
imply that individuals develop expectations about their future income from a projection
based upon individually observable and predictable characteristics. Thus, the panel of all
uijt’s represents the unexpected and stochastic component of individual earnings, which
is idiosyncratic and unpredictable to individuals. We show exemplary results from this
first stage regression in the appendix.
For the estimation of income risk and its components, we make the following assump-
tions. Suppose uijt has two components: a permanent one ωijt and a transitory one ijt.
Furthermore, assume ωit to follow a random walk process.4
uijt = ωijt + ijt (3.2.2)
ωijt = ωijt−1 + ηijt (3.2.3)
ηijt and ijt are the corresponding permanent and transitory shocks to individual earnings,
respectively. ijt is white noise, which has a temporary effect on labor income only and
would vanish in the next time period. ηijt, however, has persistence because ωijt follows
a random walk process.
ijt and ηijt in each period are white noise and i.i.d distributed.
ijt ∼ N(0, σ2,j,t) (3.2.4)
ηijt ∼ N(0, σ2η,j,t) (3.2.5)
4The random walk assumption is not the only possible structure underlying the income process. For
instance, other papers have suggested including a third, MA(1), component. Yet, as Krebs and Yao
(2009) show, the permanent component of income risk is hardly affected by different assumptions on the
income process. We therefore stick to the random walk assumption.
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ijt and ηijt are independent for all leads and lags, that is, cov(ijt, ijs) = 0, ∀t 6=
s, cov(ηijt, ηijs) = 0,∀t 6= s, cov(ijt, ηijs) = 0,∀t, s. σ2,j,t and σ2η,j,t are the variances of
the transitory and permanent shocks to income, while σ,j,t and ση,j,t are the standard
deviation of transitory and permanent labor income shocks, respectively.
Based on this assumed structure of the unexplained part of income, we can single out
the permanent component of income risk. There are two different strategies usually
employed in the literature. They differ in their assumptions on whether income risk can
be assumed to be time-independent.5 While assuming time-independence substantially
simplifies the estimation, we will nevertheless calculate time-varying income risk. Recall
that we are interested in measuring changes in income risk in order to link them to
offshoring developments.
Estimation of Time-specific Income Risk
The assumption of time-independence taken by many related studies may seem to be a
strong one. Shocks to permanent labor income in reality could differ across time periods
due to, e.g. macroeconomic factors such as business cycle movements or trade related
influences.6 In fact, this is exactly what our paper is aiming to identify: How changes in
permanent income risk can be explained. We therefore briefly describe the procedure for
estimation of yearly values of permanent income risk. This subsection closely follows and
extends the GMM estimation method employed in Krebs, Krishna, and Maloney (2010)
for a short run panel data of 5 quarters to long run panel data of 10 years.7
For the changes in the unexplained income over time, we can generally write the n-year
difference of uit as
4nuit = uit+n − uit = ηit+1 + ...+ ηit+n + it+n − it (3.2.6)
5For instance, the assumption of time-constant income risk is taken by (see Carroll and Samwick,
1997; Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994; Krishna and Senses, 2009).
6Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) argue that the conditional variance of these permanent in-
come shocks is counter-cyclical, increasing during contractions and decreasing during expansions. Krebs,
Krishna, and Maloney (2010) find that trade policy has a significant effect on income risk.
7We drop the industry subscript j for expositional reasons in this subsection.
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The variance of changes in the unexplained component of individual income between
period t and t+ n thus is given by:
V [4nuit+n] = σ2η,t+1 + ...+ σ2η,t+n + σ2,t + σ2,t+n. (3.2.7)
Deviating from ?, (3.2.7) is a larger and more complicated system of moment conditions
due to more time periods included in the data. The estimation furthermore relies on addi-
tional moment conditions for the transitory component. In particular, it is assumed that
this component of income risk is identical for the first and last two periods. Naturally, this
also restricts the permanent component to being the same for those periods. According to
?, the permanent component of income risk can be estimated from (3.2.7). V [4nuit] can
be estimated as Vˆ [4nuˆit], where uˆit are the predicted residual income terms from the first
stage regressions (3.2.1) for individual i in time t. 4nuˆit is the n order difference of uˆit. In
the estimation V [4nuit] is the dependent variable with observations Vˆ [4nuˆit]. In (3.2.7),
the left hand side observations are thus different combinations of σ2η,t and σ2,t, when n and
t on the right hand side vary. If σ2η,t and\or σ2,t are included in a certain V [4nuit], we
put a 1 at the corresponding position in the matrix as the observation of the independent
variable. If it is not included, we put a 0 instead. This renders our independent variables
different combinations of entries with 1 or 0, with corresponding coefficients σ2η,t or σ2,t.
We will have enough observations of V [4nuit], if there are sufficiently many time periods
in our data. Then, we can run OLS regression as the last step of our GMM estimation,
and the OLS estimators σˆ2η,t and σˆ2,t are the unbiased estimates of σ2η,t and σ2,t. Hence,
the result are industry level estimates for the two components of income risk.
3.2.2 Data and Implementation
Our main data source is a sample from official social security records from the German
Employment Agency ("BA-Employment panel").8
8This study uses the factually anonymous BA-Employment Panel (Years 1998 - 2007). Data access
was provided via a Scientific Use File supplied by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal
Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). For detailed information on
the database, see Schmucker and Seth (2009).
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We use information on income for individuals that stay within the same 2-digit manufac-
turing industry for at least two consecutive periods. On the one hand, we thus observe
income variation for people who remain employed, yet face income changes due to wage
changes and changes in other payments such as bonuses. On the other hand, we do not
exclude individuals that lose their job once or several times as long as they are re-employed
in the same industry at some point in our sample, irrespective of how long the unemploy-
ment spell is. In fact, temporary job loss is likely an important source of variation in
income as job transition is often accompanied by a loss of occupation or employer-specific
human capital leading to persistent changes in income. If an individual is employed in
several industries over the sample period, we treat it as if it were two different individuals.
That is, we use variation occurring during employment within an industry, but not be-
tween industries. We thus do not include variation based on individuals switching between
industries or out of manufacturing in general. We admit that switching industries can be
a source of income risk, yet one that is difficult to assign to any particular industry’s ag-
gregate income risk.9 In terms of variation coming from within industry income changes,
our approach is the same as in Krebs, Krishna, and Maloney (2010). Even within these
limits, we will show that there is considerable variation in individual income and that a
substantial part of this is reflected in permanent income risk. With the above in mind,
the results for industry level income risk are best interpreted as representing an average
expression for income risk akin to a representative industry characteristic.
The BA-Panel has a 10 year time period. More importantly, it has a large number of in-
dividual observations per industry and year. Thus, it allows us to estimate yearly income
risk. It represents a 2 percent random sample drawn from official German employment
records based on social security contributions for the years from 1998 to 2007. Income
information in this case is log-monthly income and includes non-wage payments such as
bonuses to the employees. We further restrict the panel to full-time employed, work-
ing age, male, West German residents. This still leaves us with a total of more than
9Krishna and Senses (2009) estimate income risk to be higher for individuals experiencing a transition
from one industry to another when compared to individuals staying in one industry. We thus regard our
estimations of income risk as representing a lower bound. If one were to link individual income risk
arising from switching industries to offshoring one would have to be able to clearly and causally identify
offshoring as the reason for the switch - a task that we cannot accomplish with our data at hand.
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800,000 individual observations. We then proceed by applying the estimation approach
for time-varying income risk. Note that our focus on permanent income implies that
we only obtain estimates for the years up to 2005, since persistence of shocks is hard
to observe when approaching the last years of the sample. Furthermore our estimation
approach technically relies on the additional assumption that in the first two periods, in-
come risk values are identical. This leaves us with observations for the years 1999 to 2005.
A common concern about such official German employment records is that the accompany-
ing income information is censored at the legal threshold for social security contributions.
This is the case in the present data as well. It is of potential concern that some income
variation might be precluded from the analysis. Note that even an approach as ours,
which relies on variation over time within industries when linking offshoring and income
risk, is affected since the share of individuals at the income threshold is non-constant.
On the other hand, the problem is less severe in manufacturing and particularly among
low-skilled workers. These individuals simply rarely reach the threshold income.
Finally, the BA-panel data is quarterly in its original style. Yet, most of the income
information is based on one entry per year only (so called "Jahresmeldung"). Thus, only
yearly information can be used for our purposes. We do so by using monthly income data
points from the December waves only.10
3.2.3 Income Risk: Results
In table 3.2.1, we present results derived from the more detailed BA-Employment panel.
There is considerable heterogeneity across industries. The employment weighted average
risk to residual monthly income stands at around 6 %. The estimates in table 3.2.1 are
somewhat lower than those found in other studies, e.g. in Krebs, Krishna, and Maloney
(2010). Note, however, that this latter study, as well as others, overestimates permanent
income risk since it assumes all remaining income variation after 4 quarters to be perma-
nent, whereas we treat changes from one year to the next as transitory still. Furthermore,
10The few remaining assumed imputed incomes, which are reported in the absence of a report by the
employer, so-called "Fortschreibefälle", are deleted.
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some studies rely on total household income which inherently has higher risk since it
includes the outcomes of labor-leisure choice and substitution effects between household
members. Additionally, it is plausible that by international standards the German labor
market features lower income risk due to stronger institutions such as employment pro-
tection and wage bargaining coordination. In terms of identification of the connection
to offshoring, we will not use levels information but either use industry fixed effects es-
timation or first-difference the data. Hence, we use information on the variation within
industries rather than the heterogeneity in the levels between them.
Table 3.2.1: Descriptives: estimated variances of permanent components
Industry Code σˆ2η,j σˆη,j Change (σˆ2η,j)
Food Products and Beverages 15 0.0043 0.0657 -0.0009
Textiles 17 0.0039 0.0621 0.0041
Wearing Apparel; Dressing 18 0.0055 0.0740 -0.0003
Wood Products, Except Furniture 20 0.0032 0.0564 0.0045
Pulp, Paper and Paper Products 21 0.0028 0.0528 -0.0028
Publishing, Printing 22 0.0040 0.0634 0.0018
Chemicals and Chemical Products 24 0.0022 0.0472 0.0043
Rubber and Plastic Products 25 0.0035 0.0593 0.0000
Other Non-metallic Mineral Products 26 0.0031 0.0558 0.0040
Basic Metals 27 0.0030 0.0543 0.0004
Fabricated Metal Prod., ex. Machinery 28 0.0038 0.0619 0.0006
Machinery and Equipment NEC 29 0.0034 0.0587 0.0011
Office Machinery and Computers 30 0.0052 0.0723 -0.0056
Electrical Machinery 31 0.0030 0.0546 -0.0018
Radio, Television and Communication 32 0.0039 0.0621 0.0034
Medical, Precision and Optical 33 0.0031 0.0554 0.0046
Motor Vehicles, Trailers 34 0.0026 0.0506 0.0005
Other Transport Equipment 35 0.0038 0.0614 -0.0039
Furniture; Manufacturing NEC 36 0.0040 0.0632 0.0000
Notes: Values for income risk are averages over time. Changes are first-to-last period differences of
absolute values. The employment weighted industry average is 5.9 % (¯ˆση,j = 0.0588). Industry names
may be incomplete.
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3.2.4 Measuring the Offshoring Intensity
Offshoring is measured using input-output tables and trade data following a method
introduced by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and extended by Geishecker (2006). The
offshoring intensities are calculated to represent the amount of an industry’s intermediate
inputs purchased from the same industry abroad in total industry output. This emphasizes
the fact that the product could have likely been produced at home as well, and precludes
situations in which traditionally imported goods count as offshoring. The offshoring
intensity therefore is assumed to describe the outcome of multiple firm’s make-or-buy
decisions aggregated to the industry level. Note that it captures offshoring that occurs
within as well as outside of a firm. In terms of the original notation introduced by Feenstra
and Hanson (1999) our measure is the offshoring intensity in a "narrow" sense. Technically
it looks as follows:
OFFjt =
IMPj∗t × Ωj∗jt
Yjt
. (3.2.8)
Yjt is output of j at time t. Ωj∗jt describes the share of all imports from a specific 2-digit
NACE 1.1 industry (j∗) abroad, used in the respective industry (j) at home. These shares
are derived from yearly import matrices that are part of the input-output tables provided
by the Statistical Office in Germany. IMPj∗t are all imports from the foreign industry j∗,
taken from the OECD STAN database, just as the output values. The data on imports
and industry output are deflated using an aggregate manufacturing import price deflator
and industry specific producer price indices, respectively.11
We furthermore differentiate between worldwide offshoring and offshoring to non-OECD
countries. Here we again draw on the OECD STAN database and multiply the imports
in (3.2.8) by the share of imports coming from non-OECD countries.12 Note that this
region-specific calculation of offshoring entails the common assumption of identical Ωj∗jt
for the two groups of countries, since the input-output tables do not hold any region
11The import price index is taken from Destatis and the industry specific indices for producer prices
come from the EU KLEMS (March 2008) release.
12When calculating import shares for non-OECD countries, we had to rely on aggregates for industries
15-16; 17-19 and 21-22 and thus use the same non-OECD share for each industry within the respective
group. Note, however, that this only applies to the non-OECD trade share and neither to total imports
IMPj∗t nor Ωj∗jt.
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specific information. The special distinction of non-OECD offshoring is meant to reflect
the cost savings motive inherent in offshoring – a concept at the core of most theoretical
approaches as well as the common public worries.
Table 3.2.2 shows offshoring intensities for the different manufacturing industries. Overall,
worldwide offshoring has reached significantly higher levels than offshoring to low-income
countries. Yet, starting from low values, growth rates are higher for offshoring to non-
OECD countries. Additionally, we observe positive growth in all industries but wood
products for non-OECD offshoring, while two more industries had a lower worldwide off-
shoring intensity in 2005 compared to 1999. Interestingly, for both measures the industries
show quite some heterogeneity with respect to variations over time. This variation will
be important in identifying the effect of offshoring on income risk later on.
3.3 Econometric Specification
We now turn to developing a suitable estimation strategy for an evaluation of the impact
of offshoring on income risk. The general idea for the identification of the effect of off-
shoring on income risk is that exogeneous improvements in communication technology and
the integration of many large Emerging Market Economies into the world trading system
led to the observed surge in offshoring. Against this background it seems plausible to us
to assume exogeneity of offshoring. Yet, some doubt remain. In particular, industry level
shocks related to institutions or technology that affect both offshoring and income risk
could pose problems to our identification strategy. We thus specify a model that tries to
capture most of these possible disturbing influences. The data at hand permits a panel
approach controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in two dimensions: industry and time.
Industry-specific effects may well matter for the relationship between offshoring and in-
come risk. Some industries are probably more inherently risky than others. This may be
due to different demand elasticities for their products or unique employment structures
in terms of jobs and tasks that can differ in their idiosyncratic risk. These industry fixed
effects (FE) also play an important role in ameliorating endogeneity concerns. It could be
argued for instance that labor market institutions are correlated with both income risk
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Table 3.2.2: Offshoring - descriptives
worldwide non-OECD
Industry Code 1999 2005 change 1999 2005 change
Food Products and Beverages 15 3.04 3.97 0.93 0.44 0.63 0.20
Textiles 17 10.87 8.79 -2.08 4.27 4.42 0.15
Wearing Apparel; Dressing 18 10.81 12.94 2.13 4.24 6.51 2.27
Wood Products, Except Furniture 20 4.71 3.49 -1.22 1.13 1.11 -0.01
Pulp, Paper and Paper Products 21 7.95 8.87 0.92 0.40 0.54 0.14
Publishing, Printing 22 0.12 0.92 0.80 0.01 0.06 0.05
Chemicals and Chemical Products 24 13.28 13.73 0.45 0.87 0.98 0.12
Rubber and Plastic Products 25 0.95 1.48 0.53 0.09 0.19 0.10
Other Non-metallic Mineral Produc 26 1.98 2.08 0.10 0.22 0.34 0.12
Basic Metals 27 10.55 16.35 5.79 1.70 3.36 1.67
Fabricated Metal Prod., ex. Mach. 28 1.45 1.81 0.36 0.24 0.37 0.13
Machinery and Equipment NEC 29 6.36 7.35 0.99 1.12 1.94 0.82
Office Machinery and Computers 30 3.67 13.85 10.18 0.89 6.06 5.18
Electrical Machinery 31 6.50 6.57 0.07 1.17 1.52 0.35
Radio, Television, Communication 32 7.06 19.75 12.68 1.67 6.99 5.32
Medical, Precision and Optical 33 4.12 4.52 0.40 0.62 0.71 0.09
Motor Vehicles, Trailers 34 7.93 10.21 2.29 0.30 0.55 0.24
Other Transport Equipment 35 21.09 13.03 -8.06 1.02 1.18 0.16
Furniture; Manufacturing NEC 36 7.17 9.42 2.25 2.29 3.81 1.51
Notes: Values are calculated according to OFFjt = IMPj∗t×Ωj∗jtYjt (see text) and represent percentage
values. Changes are absolute changes.
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and offshoring. Strong unions could be responsible for less fluctuations in income and
dampened offshoring activities at the same time, introducing bias in our results. Yet,
variables capturing labor market institutions usually have very limited time series varia-
tion. Hence, as long as these characteristics are specific to an industry and do not vary
over time, a fixed effects setup will capture this type of unobserved heterogeneity. The
same logic holds true for using an approach based on first-differencing (FD) the data. In
our case, we show results from both FE and FD estimation. In addition to industry fixed
effects, we can employ time fixed effects for time-varying factors that are unobservable
to us, such as business cycle effects at the country or world level, which capture this
variation as long as it is uniform across industries. Some further remaining variation
that could possibly bias our results will be picked up by the control variables included
in the model. In particular, these will be the industry specific and time-varying research
and development spending share in value added (to capture industry specific technology
shocks) and the labor share of income (as an approximation to time-varying union influ-
ences). Furthermore, we include measures for the export share in production (capturing
another dimension of dependency on international output fluctuations) and the import
penetration ratio (to provide for a comparison with the literature – Krishna and Senses
(2009), in particular).13 A further point deserves attention. Given the structure of our
data set, we have to be careful when calculating standard errors (Krebs, Krishna, and
Maloney, 2010). Our dependent variable σˆ2ηjt is by itself the outcome of an estimation at
the industry level. While, according to Krebs, Krishna, and Maloney (2010), this does not
bias the regression coefficients in the second stage, with different standard errors across
industries from the first-stage estimations, we are facing heteroscedasticity. We therefore
follow Krebs, Krishna, and Maloney (2010) and Krishna and Senses (2009) and report
robust standard errors based on a Huber-White-correction.
With the above considerations in mind, we arrive at the following empirical model. The
model also allows for the inclusion of lagged effects of offshoring on income risk if we chose
N > 0:
σ2ηjt = ΣNi=0βiOFFjt−i + γXjt + φj + ϕt + νjt (3.3.1)
13All these data are retrieved from the OECD STAN database.
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In this model, Xjt is the control vector. φj represents the industry fixed effects and ϕt are
indicators for years (t), respectively. νjt represents the model’s independent error term.
3.4 Results: Offshoring and Income Risk
3.4.1 Main Results
In this subsection we present the results based on the above model - estimated once as
the FE model in equation (3.3.1) and once as an alternative FD specification. Table 3.4.1
reveals the main result: an increase in offshoring correlates with lower permanent income
risk. We present results for one-year lagged values of offshoring as explanatory variables,
because we do not find any significant contemporaneous correlation. This points to the
impact offshoring has on income risk as the outcome of a change in how employment and
production are organized internationally. Recall, that income risk measures shocks from
an ex-ante perspective, i.e. it describes how shocks at a given time play out over future
periods. We can therefore state that, on average, workers in an industry that shifts more
tasks abroad will subsequently face less severe shocks to permanent income.14
We find negative coefficients on the different offshoring variables throughout columns (1)
to (4) in table 3.4.1. The results are statistically significant at conventional levels for
the preferred specification including all controls. The coefficient value in column (3) im-
plies that, on average, an increase in the offshoring intensity by one percentage point
decreases the variance of permanent component by -0.00035. Compared to its (employ-
ment weighted) mean across industries and over time of 0.00345, this represents a decrease
of a little more than 10% for every percentage point increase in the overall offshoring in-
tensity. The effect is stronger and more precisely estimated for offshoring to non-OECD
countries. The results in column (4) show the effect to be roughly four times the size of
the corresponding value for worldwide offshoring. This type of offshoring, however, shows
a smaller absolute increase over time: roughly half a percentage point.
The coefficients of the control variables, which were mainly included to control for possible
14This does not say anything about the possible effects of displacements at the margin of offshoring.
Yet, according to some recent studies, offshoring does not seem to be a major cause of overall job-loss at
the industry level (Harrison and McMillan, 2011; OECD, 2007).
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sources of bias, only hold a small bit of additional information. The coefficient for the
import penetration ratio is found to be positive, yet not within the conventional signif-
icance bounds. We take this finding to weakly confirm the result found in Krishna and
Senses (2009) for the US also for Germany. The R&D share does not have any statisti-
cally significant effect. It seems as if this variable is unable to approximate technological
change above and beyond common aggregate-level trends captured by the time effects.
The export share in production does not emerge as a main influence on industry level
income risk either.
Turning to the results based on a first-difference estimation, the overall picture is con-
firmed. We find negative coefficients of offshoring throughout, albeit with stronger sig-
nificance for offshoring to non-OECD countries. The coefficients are mostly of a similar
magnitude as well, with the one on non-OECD offshoring in the fully specified model be-
ing higher than before. In summary, our results from both models show a negative effect
of offshoring on the permanent component of income risk. With respect to worldwide
offshoring the picture regarding statistical significance is a bit mixed. Offshoring to non-
OECD countries on the other hand has a particularly strong and significant negative effect.
3.4.2 Robustness
In addition to the various specifications above, we further test the robustness of our
results by manipulation the estimation sample. We focus on the negative link between
income risk and offshoring to non-OECD economies since this connection was stronger
and statistically significant in the main tables. Results for worldwide offshoring are as
above, negative but with mixed statistical significance. Table 3.4.3 shows the results of
our robustness analysis. In the first column, we drop the industry with the largest change
in the permanent component of income risk (30). In the following column, we take
the industry with the highest increase in non-OECD offshoring (32) out of the sample.
Subsequently, we use an alternative data source for the offshoring measures - the data
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Table 3.4.1: Results from fixed effects regression, 1999-2005
variance of permanent component of income risk 1 2 3 4
1-year lagged offshoring intensity (world) -0.0333 -0.0350*
(0.0201) (0.0186)
1-year lagged offshoring intensity (non-OECD) -0.148* -0.139**
(0.0760) (0.0620)
export-share in production -0.0291 -0.0242
(0.0181) (0.0181)
import penetration 0.0260 0.0241
(0.0192) (0.0200)
R&D share in value added 0.0185 0.0042
(0.0114) (0.0095)
labor share 0.00031 0.0021
(0.0052) (0.0051)
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 114 114 108 108
R-squared 0.307 0.428 0.465 0.518
Number of sectors 19 19 18 18
Notes: Estimation is by fixed effects. The coefficient values on the offshoring measures are to be
understood as follows: a one unit change in offshoring (= percentage point change) corresponds to a
βˆ/100 change in the variance of persistent changes in the unexplained component of income (= permanent
income risk). Industry 36 has incomplete data coverage which leads to a slightly reduced number of
observations in some cases. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p <
0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 3.4.2: Results from first-difference regression, 2000-2005
variance of permanent component of income risk 1 2 3 4
1-year lagged offshoring intensity (world) -0.0308* -0.0376
(0.0172) (0.0272)
1-year lagged offshoring intensity (non-OECD) -0.148** -0.202*
(0.0558) (0.0979)
export-share in production -0.0213 -0.0289
(0.0301) (0.0370)
import penetration 0.0185 0.0270
(0.0253) (0.0309)
R&D share in value added 0.0004 0.0011
(0.0143) (0.0162)
labor share 0.0076 0.0106
(0.0068) (0.0078)
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 95 95 90 90
R-squared 0.229 0.260 0.299 0.367
Number of sectors 19 19 18 18
Notes: Estimation is by OLS after first-differencing the data. The coefficient values on the offshoring
measures are to be understood as follows: a one unit change in offshoring (= percentage point change)
corresponds to a βˆ/100 change in the variance of persistent changes in the unexplained component of
income (= permanent income risk). Industry 36 has incomplete data coverage which leads to a slightly
reduced number of observations in some cases. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses;
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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made available online by Ingo Geishecker.15 Finally, we also constructed income risk
measures from a different sample wave (June) of our income data. We find the results to
be highly robust to these data alterations. All offshoring coefficients are negative again.
Statistical significance is even stronger for all altered samples.
Table 3.4.3: Results from robustness analyses
variance of permanent component of income risk 2 4 6 8
without sec. 32 without sec. 30 Geishecker offsh. June wave
1-year lagged offshoring intensity (non-OECD) -0.0755*** -0.1945*** -0.3834*** -0.0845***
(0.0150) (0.0379) (0.0474) (0.0104)
export-share in production -0.0179 -0.0524*** -0.0556*** -0.0590***
(0.0149) (0.0100) (0.0180) (0.0161)
import penetration 0.0206 0.0479*** 0.0531** 0.0572***
(0.0125) (0.0104) (0.0201) (0.0188)
R&D share in value added -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
labor share 0.0057 0.0064 0.0051 -0.0021
(0.0048) (0.0056) (0.0080) (0.0036)
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 75 75 80 80
R-squared 0.4323 0.8175 0.6811 0.5109
Number of sector 15 15 16 16
Notes: Estimation is by fixed effects. The coefficient values on the offshoring measures are to be
understood as follows: a one unit change in offshoring (= percentage point change) corresponds to a
βˆ/100 change in the variance of persistent changes in the unexplained component of income (= permanent
income risk). Industry 36 has incomplete data coverage which leads to a slightly reduced number of
observations in some cases. In column (6) offshoring is to Asian countries instead of all non-OECD
countries since this is the closest definition available in the data provided by Ingo Geishecker (http:
//www.uni-goettingen.de/en/99958.html) available until 2004 and for 17 of the industries used here.
Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
3.5 Conclusion and Welfare Considerations
The analysis in this paper presents offshoring as a source of changes in permanent in-
come risk at the industry level. Income risk is an important factor in determining the
consumption, savings and thus welfare patterns in an economy. We single out offshoring
as a potential influence, given the anxiety it regularly stirs up in the public debate as
15The data are available at (http://www.uni-goettingen.de/en/99958.html). Further information
on their exact construction can be found in Geishecker (2006).
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well as its large role in international trade transactions. Within the limits of our available
data, we seeks to answer whether the fears regarding income insecurity often associated
with it are justified. We find that they are not. On the contrary, within manufacturing
industries, increased offshoring is associated with a decrease in the permanent component
of income risk.
In our empirical analysis, we first estimate industry level income risk from individual level
data, isolating the welfare-relevant permanent component. We then link it to offshoring
at the industry level in a panel framework. We find offshoring to have a negative and
(mostly) statistically significant effect on income risk for employees within industries in
manufacturing. Furthermore, there is strong evidence for a differentiated impact across
destination regions, with a stronger than average effect for offshoring to non-OECD coun-
tries. This is expected as offshoring facilitates the allocations of different tasks. Put
differently, home producers tend to offshore the more volatile part of their production to
foreign countries. In our case, German manufacturing sectors have offshored the produc-
tion or occupations with more uncertainty and fluctuations to non-OECD countries while
the occupations with less volatility have been kept.
However, with respect to welfare implications the results are less straight forward. Clearly,
taken by itself, a reduction in income risk brought about by a higher offshoring intensity
would imply a positive welfare effect. Yet, this effect might not be the only welfare-
affecting change. Two points deserve particular attention. First, the wage level still
matters as well. Individuals may have a smaller benefit if risk decreases but this comes
as a trade-off with lower average wages. Yet, on an aggregate level, this is not necessarily
to be expected. ? theoretically show that the wage effects of offshoring are ambigu-
ous, and empirical evidence often documents relative wages for different skill groups to
change while overall wages are hardly affected. Leaving considerations with respect to
a skill-specific effect to further research, we are therefore leaning towards the conclusion
that lower income risk does not come at the cost of lower average wages in manufacturing.
The second possible concern is related to employment levels. A shift of more volatile
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occupations (or tasks) abroad may change average income risk in the home country at
the expense of lower overall employment levels. The volatile jobs would move offshore
and – as a consequence – the remaining ones show a lower average income risk. Yet, it
is hard to argue that this situation is desirable from an aggregate perspective if overall
employment falls due to replacement of foreign for domestic jobs. Ideally, if composition
effects are at work, one would want the home employment to stay constant or to grow due
to productivity effects from offshoring and the workers whose tasks are moved offshore
would find re-employment in less volatile jobs. There are some hints that offshoring is
not responsible for falling employment levels in manufacturing. For instance, the OECD
states that “(...) the industrial sectors that have most downsized their workforce are not
the ones that have most engaged in offshoring. Offshoring does not therefore emerge as a
major cause of job losses.” (OECD, 2007). This finding has recently been confirmed by
Harrison and McMillan (2011) for the United States, who find most of the manufacturing
employment decline to be a result of capital-labor substitution rather than international
labor reallocation. We therefore conclude on a slightly optimistic tone. If offshoring low-
ers the permanent component of income risk, while average wages do not fall and overall
employment levels stays widely unaffected, there may be positive effects on welfare.
Finally, considering our sample includes only full time working males in manufacturing
sectors the effect of offshoring on labor income risk and welfare implication on other groups
is not fully clear. For example, female workers and part time workers. The extension of
our research is to investigate further on the link of offshoring and labor income risk for
other groups of workers.
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3.A Appendix
This additional table (3.A.1) shows results from the first stage regression generating the
income residuals. Coefficients for fixed effects are not shown. The results are based on
BA data with imputed wages from the cross section for the year 2005. Results for any
other year look nearly the same. All coefficients have the expected sign and significance.
That is, income grows with age, skill, firm size, etc.
Table 3.A.1: First stage wage regression for 2005
ln wage 1
Age 0.0374***
(0.0001)
Age-squared -0.0004***
(0.0000)
Foreign nationality 0.0104***
(0.0034)
Firm size 0.0607***
(0.0006)
Medium-skilled 0.0503***
(0.0050)
High-skilled 0.1640***
(0.0032)
Constant 7.1712***
(0.0040)
Industry fixed effects yes
2-digit occupation fixed effects yes
Observations 76,830
R-squared 0.5730
Chapter 4
Can Institutional Reform Reduce
Job Destruction and Unemployment
Duration? Yes, It Can
4.1 Introduction
This paper investigates how labor market policies affect the unemployment rate through
its two defining factors, the duration of unemployment spells and job destruction rates.
To this aim, we look at search theory’s unemployment equilibrium condition as an Iso-
Unemployment Curve (IUC). The IUC represents the locus of job destruction rates and
expected unemployment durations rendering the same unemployment level. A country’s
position along the curve reveals its preferences over the destruction-duration mix, while
its distance from the origin indicates the unemployment level at which such preferences
are satisfied. We next provide micro-foundations for the link between destructions, dura-
tions and policy variables. This allows us to explore the relevance of institutional features
using a sample of 20 OECD countries over the period 1985-2008.
The empirical literature investigating the influence of labor market institutions on overall
unemployment rate is sizable (Blanchard and Wolfers, 1999; Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel,
and Quintini, 2001). Equally numerous are the studies splitting unemployment into job
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creation and job destruction flows (Blanchard and Portugal, 1998; Elsby, Hobijn, and
Sahin, 2013; Shimer, 2012). This work connects these two strands of the literature by
investigating how labor market policies shape both job separations and unemployment
spells, which together determine the overall unemployment rate in the economy. The
IUC schedule used in our analysis is novel and is motivated by the need to understand
the nature of unemployment, as essentially coming from destructions, durations or a com-
bination of both these factors. This can help clarify whether policy makers should focus
primarily on speeding up workers’ reallocation across job positions rather than protecting
them in the workplace.
One fundamental question raised in this context is whether countries with dynamic la-
bor markets significantly outperform countries with more stagnant markets. By dynamic
(stagnant) we mean labor markets displaying high (low) levels of workers’ turnover in and
out of unemployment. Is it the case that countries featuring high job destruction rates but
brief unemployment spells tend to display lower unemployment rates than labor markets
characterized by limited job destruction but longer unemployment durations? And how
do institutional features shape destructions and durations?
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section looks at the
empirical evidence on unemployment inflows and durations. Section 4.3 introduces the
concept of IUCs, which is the backbone of our theoretical construct. Section 4.4lays out
the empirical strategy, discusses the empirical results and uses the estimated model for
simulation purposes. Section 4.5 concludes the paper.
4.2 Inflows and Durations: The Facts
Search theory allows for a decomposition of the steady-state unemployment rate into the
product of the number of workers that leave employment as percent of the labor force
and the expected duration of unemployment. As discussed in Section 4.3, it is possi-
ble to interpret this equilibrium relationship as an "Iso-Unemployment Curve" (or IUC),
reflecting the different combinations of inflows and durations compatible with the same
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unemployment level. It is precisely the reasons underlying the position of countries in the
space of IUCs that is investigated in this paper. Before we do this, it is interesting to see
where countries actually stand in the IUC schedule.
To this aim, Figures 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 decompose annual unemployment rates into the yearly
destruction rates and the expected duration of unemployment for 20 OECD countries
over the four decades ranging from 1965 to 2009. The sample comprises eleven euro-area
countries (Austria, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, the
Netherlands, and Finland) alongside nine other OECD countries (US, Canada, Australia,
Japan, UK, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland). The empirical job destruction
rates and unemployment durations have been extracted from available data on unem-
ployment rates following the methodology developed by Shimer (2012). The detailed
procedure is described in the appendix of this chapter.
Figures 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 reveal a huge variation in the unemployment inflow rates and du-
rations across countries. With both low inflows and durations, Norway, Sweden, Japan,
Switzerland, and to a lesser extent Austria, display the lowest unemployment levels. Re-
flecting a combination of brief unemployment spells and high inflow rates, North America
is situated on IUCs with low-to-moderate unemployment levels. Belgium, Italy, Ireland
and Greece have consistently featured low job destruction rates, coupled with relatively
long durations and high unemployment rates. Australia, France, Germany, the Nether-
lands, Denmark and the UK, characterized by intermediate levels of both inflows and
durations, tend to post higher unemployment rates than the first group, while their posi-
tion relative to North America is ambiguous. Reflecting elevated inflows and durations,
Spain tends to be located on IUCs with the highest unemployment levels (bar the sev-
enties). Significant variation in the relative importance of the two variables of interest
makes it difficult to characterize unemployment’s behavior in Finland.
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Figure 4.2.1: Unemployment duration and job destruction rates in 20 OECD Countries,
1965-1989
Source: Authors’ estimates of job destruction rates and expected unemployment duration based on
OECD data and the methodology described in the appendix of this chapter.
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Figure 4.2.2: Unemployment duration and job destruction rates in 20 OECD Countries,
1990-2009
Source: Authors’ estimates of job destruction rates and expected unemployment duration based on
OECD data and the methodology described in the appendix of this chapter.
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4.3 The Model
4.3.1 Equations
Theories of unemployment may be divided into two broad groups, depending on whether
they are based on stocks or flows. The specification of the labor market adopted in this
paper focuses on flows. It builds on the standard matching model developed by Pissarides
(2000). Suppose that the size of the labor force is constant1. We let ut and vt at time
t denote the unemployment and vacancy rates, both expressed as percent of the labor
force. The number of job matches taking place per unit of time is assumed to follow a
Cobb-Douglas specification of the form
mt = µv1−ρt uρt (4.3.1)
where µ denotes the degree of efficiency in the matching technology and ρ ∈ (0, 1) rep-
resents the unemployment elasticity of job matches. The job vacancies and unemployed
workers that are matched at any time t are randomly selected from the sets ut and vt.
Hence the hazard rate out of unemployment follows a Poisson process with rate
ft =
mt
ut
= µθ1−ρt (4.3.2)
where θt = vt/ut is the number of vacancies per unemployed workers or labor market
tightness. This generates an exogenous hazard rate into employment equal to ftut.
The flow into unemployment results from job-specific productivity shocks arriving to firms
at Poisson rate st. When the shock arrives, the net product of the job changes to some new
value drawn from a general probability distribution G (xt) ,where 0 ≤ xt ≤ 1 and w (xt)
stand for the job’s productivity and its corresponding wage. Let us denote by J (xt) the
1This assumption is needed to apply the methodology developed by Shimer (2012) to measure job
creation and job destruction flows. This is consistent with the view that, compared with workers’ flows
within the labor force, flows in and out of the labor force play a lesser role in explaining unemployment
movements. Once this assumption is relaxed, one cannot use publicly available data to construct all pos-
sible flows between employment, unemployment and inactivity. Micro-data on individuals’ employment
status should be used instead. Data availability issues prevent us from taking this route.
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firm’s expected profit from an occupied job. The firm chooses a reservation productivity
Rt (with J(Rt) = 0) and destroys jobs whose productivity fall below it because of the
shock. In words, job destruction operates when the reservation productivity is such that
the expected profit from an occupied job is 0. This generates an endogenous hazard rate
into unemployment equal to the product of the fraction of firms hit by a shock st, and
the probability that a shock is below reservation G(Rt ), with associated job destruction
of stG(Rt )(1− ut).The out-of-steady-state unemployment dynamics is therefore given by
ut+1 − ut = stG(Rt )(1− ut)− ftut (4.3.3)
At equilibrium the unemployment rate is constant, thus
sG(R)(1− u) = fu (4.3.4)
with the interpretation that the mean number of workers who enter unemployment is
equal to the mean number of workers who leave unemployment. Put another way,
1
f
(1− u) = 1
sG(R )u (4.3.5)
Substituting (4.3.2) into (4.3.4) and solving for the u yields
u = sG(R)(1− u) 1
µθ1−ρ
(4.3.6)
which tells us that the equilibrium unemployment rate is the product of the hazard rate
into unemployment sG(R) times the expected duration of unemployment (1− u) 1
µθ1−ρ .
Solving the model requires obtaining the equilibrium conditions for the two endogenous R
and θ, to which we now turn. Suppose that job creation satisfies the zero-profit condition2,
that job destruction operates when J(R) = 0, and that the wage sharing rule is set in a
Nash bargaining fashion. Let β  (0, 1) be the labor’s relative strength in wage bargaining,
z the unemployment income, c the hiring and firing costs of firms, κ an indicator of the
2As the model allows for regulatory costs, the zero-profit condition implies that firms’ profits are
dissipated by such costs.
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regulatory stance in the market, tw the tax wedge, and r the rental cost of capital. One
can then express labor market tightness and reservation productivity (characterizing job
creation and job destruction respectively) as a function of the exogenous variables in the
model, that is
θ = θ(β, c, κ, tw, s, r, µ, R) (4.3.7)
R = R(β, c, z, κ, tw, s, r, µ, θ) (4.3.8)
It is convenient to represent this system in the space (R, θ) while viewing the remaining
parameters as constant (Figure 4.3.1). The model behaves according to the following
logic:
• Expression (4.3.7) on job creation corresponds to the free-entry condition postulated
by search models and reflects that firms post vacancies as long as the marginal re-
cruiting cost per vacancy is equal to the expected value of holding it. At equilibrium,
the expected gain from a new job to the firm must be equal to the expected hiring
cost paid by the firm. It slopes down in the space (R, θ) because at higher reser-
vation productivity , the expected life of (and gain from) a job is reduced. Firms
create fewer jobs as a result, leading to a fall in market tightness θ.
• Expression (4.3.8) on job destruction slopes up in the space (R, θ) because at higher
θ the worker’s outside opportunities are better and wages are higher. Higher wages
translate into a lower net product of labor. Thus more marginal jobs are destroyed.
A noteworthy property implicit in the equilibrium condition (4.3.8) is that the reser-
vation productivity R is less than the reservation wage w (R). This implies some
labor hoarding in equilibrium: because job productivity might change, the firm
keeps some currently unprofitable jobs occupied.
4.3.2 Model’s predictions
Comparative statics implied by equations (4.3.7) and (4.3.8) is as follows (Figure 4.3.1):
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• At given θ,
dR
dβ
> 0, dR
dz
> 0, dR
dtw
> 0, dR
dκ
> 0, dR
dc
< 0, dR
ds
≶ 0, dR
dr
> 0 (4.3.9)
• At given R,
dθ
dβ
< 0, dθ
dz
< 0, dθ
dc
< 0, dθ
dtw
< 0, dθ
dκ
< 0, dθ
ds
< 0, dθ
dr
< 0, dθ
dµ
< 0 (4.3.10)
Consider now the influence of parameter changes on the job destruction and job creation
equilibrium values, the latter being inversely related to our second variable of interest,
the expected duration of unemployment. Bearing in mind that unemployment will change
only if the new flows implied by the change in R and θ are not equal, the model’s predic-
tions can be summarized as follows:
• Both a higher unemployment income z and a higher labor share in bargaining β raise
reservation wages. This reduces the expected gain from a job, shrinking job creation
(increasing duration) and increasing job destruction. As a result, the unemployment
rate will be higher in the new equilibrium.
• An increase in the tax wedge tw makes leisure more attractive relative to work,
putting upward pressure on bargained wages. This renders marginal workers un-
profitable and, all else being equal, more jobs are destroyed. At the same time,
higher wages reduce the expected value from job matches to the firm, thereby in-
hibiting their recruiting activities. Higher job destruction and lower job creation
therefore lead higher unemployment rates.
• Stricter regulation κ tends to lower labor productivity in equilibrium, hence damp-
ening job creation. A deterioration in competition-restraining regulations conveys
higher mark-ups to producers, who will now seek to sell their goods at higher prices.
As there is excess supply at the new prices, some unprofitable firms will exit the
market and jobs will be destroyed until a new equilibrium is reached characterized
by lower production and employment levels. Overall, the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate is hypothesized to increase following a deterioration in the regulatory
conditions.
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• Job creation increases (duration falls) if productivity changes more frequently (higher
s). Job destruction is subject to two opposing forces. On the one hand, job destruc-
tion increases because there are more shocks on average, but on the other hand, it
decreases because firms are now more willing to hold on to labor if they expect a
quick arrival of better conditions. Thus the effect of increased s on unemployment
is ambiguous.
• Higher interest rate r reduces job creation (increases duration) as future profits on
new jobs are discounted more heavily. At the same time, firms respond to higher
interest rates by destroying more jobs. This is so because the option value of keeping
unprofitable jobs is lower, given that the returns from a productivity change only
accrue in the future. Less job creation and more job destruction combine into higher
unemployment rates.
• By reducing the expected duration of vacancies, higher matching efficiency µ reduces
hiring costs for firms, increasing job creation (reducing duration) and bringing down
the unemployment rate.
• Higher hiring and firing costs c lower the expected gain from a job and reduce
job creation. Likewise, larger firing costs make firms more conservative in their
firing decisions and limit job destruction. This makes for a more stagnant labor
market, but the effect on lower inflows and higher durations on equilibrium is itself
ambiguous.
4.4 Estimating the Model
4.4.1 Data and Empirical Strategy
In order to assess the impact of labor policies on job destruction rates and the duration
of unemployment spells, we estimate empirical versions of (4.3.7) and (4.3.8) of the form:
Job destruction rateit = fei + dt +
∑
j
bjxijt +OGit + εit (4.4.1)
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Expected duration of unemploymentit = fei + dt +
∑
j
bjxijt +OGit + εit (4.4.2)
Equations (4.4.1) and (4.4.2) control for out-of-steady-state dynamics by entering the
output gap as an indicator of cyclical position in the regressions. In our notation t , i
and j are indexes for time, countries and institutions, and x represents a vector of in-
stitutions. The specification allows for country fixed and common time effects. The two
dependent variables are extracted from available data on unemployment rates following
the methodology described in the appendix of this chapter.
All institutional variables in the model are normalized to have zero mean and unit stan-
dard deviation. They are mapped into empirical concepts in the way we turn to describe.
Reservation wages z are proxied by benefit replacement rates during the first year of unem-
ployment, as averaged over various family types and earning levels (Nickell and Nunziata,
2001). Firms’ firing costs c are approximated by the OECD indicators of Employment
Protection Legislation for regular workers (EPL) and the incidence of temporary employ-
ment.
The matching efficiency is supposed to be influenced by three categories of Active La-
bor Market Policies (ALMPs). Given that heterogeneity in the synthetic indicator of
ALMPs is one reason for non-significance of these policies in previous studies (Bassanini
and Duval, 2006), we proceed with a disaggregated analysis whereby ALMP spending is
decomposed into three main categories: job seeker support by Public Employment Ser-
vices (PES), training policies and financial support to labor-demand. Data on ALMPs
programs is also taken from the OECD labor market policies database. As suggested by
Estevao (2003), we express ALMP expenditures per unemployed person as a percentage
of GDP per capita to ensure cross-country comparability.
We use union centralization and coordination measures (Visser, 2007) to calibrate work-
ers’ strength (β) in wage bargaining. Tax wedges comprise social security contributions,
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personal income and indirect tax rates (Nickell and Nunziata, 2001).
Estimating the model further requires identifying measures for productivity shocks and
overall financial conditions, which we take to be the standard deviation of labor pro-
ductivity3 and the real interest rate. As a measure of the regulatory stance in product
markets, we use the OECD indicator of regulation in Energy, Transport and Communica-
tions (ETRC). This is narrower in terms of sectoral coverage than the OECD aggregate
indicator for product market regulation but has the advantage of being available in long-
time series. Moreover, as the EU Single Market Program has been more effective in
liberalizing traditionally monopolistic sectors than in opening up services in general, the
potential for reform presented in the following section can be interpreted as a lower bound
to overall reform gains.
4.4.2 Results
We estimate the two-equation system on job destruction and unemployment durations
given by (4.4.1) and (4.4.2) using data from the 20 OECD countries listed in Section 4.2
over the period 1985-2008. The Simultaneous Equations Model (SEM) estimator we use
assumes that the two unemployment components are determined simultaneously by the
model postulated in section 4.3. SEM further allows for cross-correlation in the error
terms of the two variables of interest. Results are summarized in table 4.4.1.
As expected, unemployment inflows and durations are strongly affected by cyclical condi-
tions. At times where the economy operates above potential output and labor markets are
tighter, both job losses and the length of unemployment spells are reduced. The opposite
holds during downturns, characterized by negative output gaps, slack labor markets, and
higher unemployment inflows and durations.
3Conceptually one may distinguish between aggregate shocks, interpreted as a general increase or
decrease in job productivity, and reallocation shocks, interpreted as shocks that increase or decrease the
variance of productivity. Consistent with the theoretical approach adopted in this paper, our empirical
analysis focuses on reallocation shocks.
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For a right interpretation of the link between the set of institutional factors and the
two endogenous variables, note that, by construction, the coefficients presented in table
Shimer (2012) capture the estimated effect of each policy on unemployment inflows and
durations when the economy is producing at full capacity (i.e. zero output gap).
Our estimates for job destruction suggest strong correlations with the tax wedge, EPL
(alone and interacted with the incidence of temporary employment) and product market
regulation, which we turn to rationalize.
By increasing the price of leisure relative to working activities, a higher tax wedge pushes
up workers’ reservation wage. Workers at the margin are rendered unprofitable to firms
and more jobs are destroyed. There is some evidence that this impact depends on the
economic cycle, as indicated by the significance of the coefficient of the interaction term
between the tax wedge and the output gap. A positive sign implies that the effect of the
tax wedge on job destruction is augmented in periods when labor markets are tight (when
the output gap is positive) and less marked in periods with considerable labor market
slack (when the output gap is negative). This is consistent with workers attaching greater
value to their leisure time during upturns as compared to downturns.
In keeping with previous findings in the literature, we find that stricter job protection
rules tend to reduce job losses. However, as indicated by the positive sign of the in-
teraction term between EPL and temporary employment, the dampening effect of EPL
on job destruction is reduced in economies characterized by a high share of temporary
jobs–where labor legislation tends to differ across permanent and temporary workers.
Hurdles to competition in the services sectors result into higher equilibrium levels of
job destruction. This is because regulations that inhibit competition grant more market
power to producers, each one charging now higher prices for the goods they sell. But, as
aggregate demand is less than supply at the new prices, a number of unprofitable firms
will exit the market. And more jobs will be destroyed. Thus stricter regulations lead
to market configurations characterized by higher job destruction and lower employment
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levels.
Consistent with our theoretical priors, ALMP programs (our proxy to matching efficiency)
do not appear to have a significant impact on job destruction. Neither could we find ev-
idence of a significant relationship between bargaining coordination and the inflow rate.
Using bargaining centralization to measure the capacity of the social dialogue to internal-
ize the impact of wage demands on employment destruction preserved this result. And
the coefficients of non-linear specifications testing the Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis turned
out to be also non-significant.
Unlike direct indicators of wage bargaining, more generous replacement rates do seem to
push up reservation wages and aggravate job destruction. Our estimates could not shed
light on the theoretical ambiguity surrounding the influence of productivity changes on
job destruction.
Turning to the duration of unemployment, high tax wedges appear to discourage job
creation and prolong unemployment spells. By increasing equilibrium wages, higher tax
wedges tend to depress labor demand and increase the flow of workers into unemploy-
ment. Likewise, the unemployment benefit replacement rate is found to have a positive
impact on unemployment duration. This is likely to capture the negative impact of the
replacement rate on search incentives, as stressed in earlier works (Bassanini and Duval,
2006; Blanchard and Wolfers, 1999). EPL also has a positive, albeit weakly significant,
influence on unemployment duration.
Labor-demand support does not appear to influence unemployment durations while job-
seeker support is only borderline significant. The former result is consistent with previous
studies pointing to large dead-weight losses and substitution effects associated with em-
ployment subsidies. These studies have often been disappointing in terms of bringing the
unemployed back into unsubsidized work (?).
In contrast with both theoretical priors and economic intuition, more spending on for-
mation policies tends to result in longer unemployment spells. This could partly reflect
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Table 4.4.1: Regression results
SEM Regression: Job Destruction Rate and Unemployment Duration
Job Destruction Rate Unemployment Duration
(% of Labor Force) (Months)
Output Gap -0.0522*** -0.0201***
[-6.036] [-2.829]
EPL -0.1363** 0.0589*
[-2.449] [1.712]
EPL*Temporary Employment 0.0630** 0.0132
[2.493] [0.640]
ALMP
-Job Seeker Support -0.0241 -0.1052*
[-0.335] [-1.789]
-Training -0.0421 0.2043***
[-0.436] [2.581]
-Labor Demand Support 0.0791 -0.0573
[1.064] [-0.940]
Tax Wedge 0.1338*** 0.1028***
[3.664] [3.437]
Output Gap*Tax Wedge 0.0055* 0.0017
[1.796] [0.294]
Product Market Regulation 0.1191** 0.0358
[2.403] [-0.881]
Replacement Rate 0.0624* 0.0705*
[1.716] [1.813]
Bargaining Coordination -0.0085 -0.0396
[-0.244] [-1.379]
Real Interest Rate 0.0082 0.0897***
[0.295] [3.924]
Productivity Volatility 0.0042 -0.0274*
[0.234] [-1.862]
Total Observations 324 324
Adjusted R-squared 0.851 0.9
Note: The sample includes data for 20 OECD countries listed in Section 2. The estimation includes
cross-country fixed effects (not displayed) and year dummies as common time effects. Dependent
variables are in logs. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate
that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
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reverse causality, as those programs can be adjusted more rapidly in response to an eco-
nomic downturn and longer unemployment spells than, say, EPL or tax wedges. Moreover,
training programs may reduce search efforts if not properly designed, and in the case where
participation in such programs represents a more attractive alternative to workers than
open unemployment, they could even augment wage demands. In any event, any bene-
ficial effects of ALMPs need to be weighed against the costs of taxes required to finance
them, which may in turn increase unemployment.
Our estimates confirm the theoretical prediction that job creation increases (duration
falls) in response to more frequent changes in productivity while the time spent in look-
ing for a job appears to be inversely related with real interest rates.
One interesting finding from our analysis is that, with the notable exception of EPL and
ALMPs, all remaining labor market institutions seem to impact the job destruction rate
and the unemployment duration in the same direction. Countries with both high inflows
into unemployment and long durations may therefore find efficient to use the policies that
affect both dimensions at the same time.
4.4.3 Policy Implications from Some Illustrative Simulations
To get an idea of the model’s projection capacity of both inflows and durations, we apply
the coefficients estimated intable 4.4.1 to output gap forecasts over the period 2010-124.
These estimates are based on the most updated (i.e. 2008) institutional configurations in
each country. The projection exercise is meant to illustrate the link between the model’s
institutional variables and the two unemployment components, rather than to provide ac-
curate forecasts over the referred period. The projections presented in this section should
therefore be taken with caution.
Figure 4.4.1 ranks countries according to their expected behavior in terms of inflows and
4The cut-off date for the forecasts is July 2011.
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durations. Projections reflect a wide variation in countries’ experiences. The duration
of unemployment spells ranges from around 26 months in Greece to 5.6 in Norway. Bel-
gium, Ireland, Italy and Portugal also feature comparatively long durations. The shortest
unemployment spells are projected for the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries. Job de-
struction rates are envisaged to be the highest in countries as heterogeneous as Canada,
Finland, Spain, and the US; and the lowest in Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium, Belgium
and Switzerland.
We now turn to calibrate the impact of changes in institutional variables on unemploy-
ment inflows and durations. To this aim, we quantify the (percentage point) difference
from baseline projections induced by i) a move to best sample practices in services regula-
tion; ii) a 5-percentage-point reduction in tax wedges; iii) a 5-percentage-point reduction
in replacement rates; iv) a simulation combining all the above changes. Rather than as a
literal description of what every country ought to do, the simulations presented here are
meant to illustrate the scope for less employment destruction and lower unemployment
duration, as well as to generate a benchmark against which to make cross-country com-
parisons. Clearly, countries need not to adopt such reform package in full, but may target
specific policy areas depending on the nature of the unemployment problem and decide
on the pace of reform that best suits their needs.
The results are indicative of substantial gains from reform (figure 4.4.2). Our simulations
imply that removing the hurdles to entering key services and alleviating the tax burden
on labor can each reduce job destruction rates permanently by 0.05 percentage points on
average for the whole sample. And by stimulating job search, lower replacement rates
and tax wedges can limit the duration of unemployment spells up to 20 and 50 days,
respectively. The combined impact of those changes would yield sizable unemployment
reductions in all countries, with Greece, Spain, France, Finland, Ireland, Belgium, and
Italy benefiting the most from the implementation of the combined package (figure 4.4.3).
Of course, actual unemployment impact will vary with the ambition of the reform agenda,
the speed of its implementation, and the time needed for these reforms to take hold.
These reforms could go hand in hand with reducing inequalities. In countries where labor
market duality remains unacceptably high, measures to harmonize employment protec-
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Figure 4.4.1: Job destruction rates and unemployment duration: baseline Projections
Source: Authors’ Calculations.
1/ Projections are based on the estimated coefficients reflected in Table 1, 2010-2012 output gap data
and 2008 institutional configurations in each country.
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Figure 4.4.2: Reform impact on job destruction rates and unemployment duration
Source: Authors’ Calculations.
1/ The heatmap illustrates changes in job destruction rates and unemployment durations assuming that
(i) every country adjusts PMR to best sample practices; (ii) replacement rates are cut down by 5
percentage points across-the-board.
2/ Percentage point reduction for job destruction rates and reduction in days for unemployment
duration.
Figure 4.4.3: Combined reform impact on unemployment rates
Source: Authors’ Calculations.
1/ The simulation illustrates the scope for reform by assuming that tax wedges and benefit replacement
rates are each reduced by 5 percentage points in every country; and PMR is adjusted to match best
sample practices.
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tion benefits between types of job contracts should reduce the disproportionate burden
on temporary workers—those last hired and first fired. Our simulations suggest that a
reduction in job protection rules for regular workers to cover only 14 of the distance with
the least regulated economies would have a neutral impact on unemployment, provided
it is accompanied by a reduction in temporary unemployment to match best practices.
4.5 Conclusions
This paper reads the basic unemployment equilibrium condition postulated by search
theory as an Iso-Unemployment Curve (IUC). The IUC is the locus of job destruction
rates and expected unemployment durations that render the same unemployment level.
We use this schedule to classify countries according to their preferences over the job
destruction-unemployment duration trade-off. The upshot of this analysis is that labor
markets characterized by high levels of job destruction but brief unemployment spells do
not necessarily outperform countries characterized by the opposite behavior. But, the
IUC construct makes it clear that high unemployment rates result from extreme values
in either durations or destructions, or intermediate-to-high levels in both.
Looking at unemployment through the lenses of the IUC schedule focuses the attention
on each economy’s revealed social preferences over the destruction-duration mix. Policy
packages fighting unemployment should take into consideration such preferences. Some
countries seem to tolerate relatively high destruction rates as long as unemployment du-
ration is short. Others are biased towards job security and do not mind financing longer
job search spells. A few unfortunate countries are trapped in a high inflow-high duration
combination, seemingly condemned for long periods of high unemployment.
An optimistic message arising from this study, especially for countries located on higher
IUCs, is that an ambitious structural reform program tackling high labor tax wedges,
activating unemployment benefits and removing barriers to competition in key services
can effectively reduce job losses, limit the duration of unemployment spells and yield
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substantial reduction in unemployment.
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4.A Appendix
Measuring Job Destruction and Unemployment Durations
This appendix presents the methodology used to estimate annual time series of flow
hazard rates into and out of unemployment. It also discusses how to infer the average
duration of unemployment spells consistent with such flows. The procedure builds on
Shimer (2007). However, this approach cannot be directly applied to European countries
as unemployment duration is not available at monthly frequencies in the European Labor
Force Survey. To overcome this limitation, we follow the methodology proposed by Elsby
and others (2008). This methodology exploits annual and quarterly data to measure
annual averages of monthly unemployment flows.
Let us denote by F<12t the probability that an unemployed worker exits unemployment
within one year. The annual change in the unemployment stock can be expressed as
ut+12 − ut = u<12t+12 − F<12t ut (4.A.1)
Here u<12t+1 represents the stock of unemployed workers with duration less than one year (i.e.
the yearly flow into unemployment), and F<12t ut represents the flows out of unemployment.
Solving for the annual outflow probability F<12t , one obtains
1− F<12t =
ut+12 − u<12t+12
ut
= ut+12 − u
<12
t+12
ut+12︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
ut+12
ut︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(4.A.2)
where the factor A represents the fraction of unemployment with duration longer than
one year and the ratio B is the annual gross growth rate of unemployment. Assuming
that the monthly outflow hazard rate for workers unemployed less than one year f<12out,t is
constant within years, the annual outflow probability F<12t is related to f<12out,t through
e−12f
<12
out,t = 1− F<12t (4.A.3)
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so that F<12t can be mapped into f<12out,t in the following manner
f<12out,t = − ln
(
1− F<12t
)
/12 (4.A.4)
where f<12out,t is the hazard rate for unemployed workers of duration lower than one year,
which is related to the probability that an unemployed worker at time t completes her
spell within the subsequent twelve months.
In order to obtain estimates of the corresponding inflow hazard rates f<12in,t , let us refor-
mulate the evolution of the monthly unemployment rate over time as
dut
dt
= f<12in,t (1− ut)− f<12out,tut (4.A.5)
Assuming that the flow hazards are constant within years and solving equation (4.A.5)
forward one year, we can relate the variation in the unemployment stock ut over the course
of the year to the variation in the underlying hazard rates f<12in,t and f<12out,t:
ut = λtu∗t + (1− λt)ut−12 (4.A.6)
where the steady-state unemployment rate u∗t is given by:
u∗t =
f<12in,t
f<12in,t + f<12out,t
(4.A.7)
and the annual rate of convergence to the steady state λt is found to be:
λt = 1− e−12(f<12in,t +f<12out,t) (4.A.8)
To operationalize the methodology described above, we use OECD annual data on unem-
ployment rates and unemployment rates by duration to compute equation (4.A.2). Given
F<12t ,we use equation (4.A.4) to estimate f<12in,t , which together with ut allows us to obtain
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f<12out,t through equations (4.A.6), (4.A.7) and (4.A.8).
The inflow rates estimated above are combined with annual data for the unemployment
rates to estimate through equation (4.A.4) the average duration of unemployment spells
for the four decades ranging from the 1970s throughout the 2000s.
Cross Correlation in Error Terms of SEM Regression
Table 4.A.1 reports the correlation coefficients of residual unemployment inflows and
durations in the 20 countries of our sample over the four decades ranging from 1965 to
2009.
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Table 4.A.1: Cross correlation in error terms of SEM regression of (4.4.1) and (4.4.2)
Country Correlation coefficients
of residual job destruction rates and unemployment durations
Australia -0.4378
Austria -0.9482***
Belgium 0.1165
Canada -0.835***
Denmark 0.2212
Finland -0.7299***
France -0.9915***
Germany -0.8207***
Greece -0.6761***
Ireland -0.4226*
Italy -0.4271
Japan 0.3236
Netherlands -0.235
Norway -0.6157**
Portugal -0.4726*
Spain -0.1038
Sweden -0.6499*
Switzerland -0.7417***
United Kingdom -0.4621***
United States -0.71***
Note: Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate that the estimated coefficient is significantly
different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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